




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Elections: Struggle for Power Undecided

92EP0070B Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 44,
2 Nov 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Marian Turski and Wieslaw Wladyka: "A Lesson in Humility"]

[Text] The elections had, so to speak, a poetic dimension of their own. They were to promote democracy and freedom, to finally end the transition period, to bury the "Contract Sejm" [under "Roundtable" agreements a Sejm dominated two-thirds by the Communists], and to decommunize the political system. But the elections had also another and more prosaic dimension: They represented, above all and simply, an ordinary struggle for power or at least for sharing it. And that struggle has remained unresolved.

* * *

Whether we like it or not, whether we want it or not, there is one obvious truth ensuing from the results of the elections and the recorded voter turnout: that is what we are like nowadays. The low voter turnout signals that confidence in politics as such continues to diminish, that the public does not believe in the existence of any genuine relationship between voting and popular wellbeing. This is an extremely disturbing fact, because the silent majority is and shall remain a great political unknown. What energies is it accumulating and how will they be released? These questions and apprehensions handicap any political program, especially considering that, in the nature of things, it shall always reflect the will of the minority, whatever it is. [as published]

The Mosaic

Well, 40 percent of the electorate voted for various small parties. Here, criticism of the electoral law will be counterproductive. The elections answered the questions they were intended to answer after all: How do Poles think politically? Of a certainty, it was worthwhile to learn this truth, in all of its beauty. Now there will be the problem of governing. Had the electoral law been intended to resolve this matter alone, by means of a somewhat artificial promotion of strong political parties, it would have done so at the expense of pluralism and social representation. It would then perhaps have been easier to govern, but the falsification of the political reality would be an incontrovertible fact. The electoral law—and characteristically it is being most strongly criticized nowadays by those who had not so long ago been its defenders—is not created solely in order to make governing easier but also, and perhaps above all, to link the policy of those who govern to those being governed.

Hard as they may be to take, the elections show the truth and provide a dose of humility. They caused most of the candidates for leading roles in the state to eat humble pie.

Suppose that the dream of certain politicians is fulfilled and the elections were based on majority rule. Let us say

that the Democratic Union is the winner and becomes the majority party in the Sejm. What of it? It would form a government with strong parliamentary support, but such a government, while impervious to parliamentary attacks, would be totally defenseless in face of the frustrated—and perhaps desperate—extraparlimentary opposition. Consider the strength of the reaction of extraparlimentary groupings to the authentic Solidarity core in the Sejm which had enjoyed strong public support. Incidentally, that was the reason why Lech Walesa believed that the breakup of Solidarity should be accelerated, precisely in order to pluralize the Polish political scene. And this indeed happened; it was a kind of success that bore in itself the roots of failure.

Of course, this raises the question of whether that breakup was justified. Should not that "war at the top" [the schism within Solidarity] have been postponed for some time in order to somehow guide Poland under the tutelage of a somehow united Solidarity across the "Red Sea" from one system of society to another? Should not this have been done also in the national interest, even if this meant suppressing the emergence of many small political groupings as well as suppressing the personal ambitions of certain politicians? But nowadays such questions belong in the domain of a historiosophic "as if," because the milk has been spilled and at present the landscape after the battle and its eventual consequences have to be considered.

Is 27 October [the date of the elections] a shock, as most commentators stated on the feverish night of the elections?

Who is disappointed after 27 October? Few should feel that way, if we compare the forecasts of opinion survey institutes with the electoral results.

They are very close.

There were three surprises as compared with the expectations: the biggest surprise was caused by the Confederation for an Independent Poland, which thrice as many voters as forecast had supported, by the Electoral Catholic Action, which was supported by twice as many voters as forecast, and by the Alliance of the Democratic Left, which was supported by nearly twice as many voters as forecast.

Three Surprises

Consider that in the last few days prior to the elections the pressures on voters grew tremendously. There were the two presidential speeches warning against "post-Communist forces," the strong campaigning by the clergy and its role as advisers to the Christian parties, and especially List No. 17, and the anti-Communist comments voiced repeatedly in the press, radio, and television. Then also there were the subliminal television messages on the eve of election day, showing Katyn and other aspects of modern Polish history. But the minds of a substantial segment of the electorate were also swayed by the highly sensitive national issue of old-age pensions

and annuities. It appears that these factors, both positive and negative, in the electoral campaign influenced the above-mentioned three surprises.

It is interesting that large number of political experts did expect an increase in voter support for precisely the groupings mentioned above, especially for the WAK [Electoral Catholic Action] and the SLD [Alliance of the Democratic Left], in the event of a large voter turnout; here the forecasts proved somewhat mistaken. It should definitely be assumed that in the presence of a low voter turnout (40 percent), the better organized and more efficient parties, that is, the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], the SLD, and the PSL [Polish Peasant Party], coped better.

Thus, in principle, the electoral results should not have surprised the concerned parties. Yet they did surprise them! Why? Because many groupings preferred to believe in their own dreams. The reality has jarred awake many politicians.

Consider the results that had been expected by the leaders of discrete groupings (as we had witnessed on TV).

Deputy Lopuszanski (WAK) expected some 15 or so percent, but his party won less than 10 percent. Deputy Bugaj expected 2 to 8 percent, but the results were at the lower level. Deputy Krzysztof Krol predicted 30-40 percent (although he emphasized that he expected that figure only in the distant future). Deputy Korwin-Mikke (UPR) [Union for Real Politics] expected 11 percent but won less than 3 percent; Senator Slisz (Labor Party), 15-25 percent, but his party won only about 5 percent; and Deputy Bogdan Borusewicz (NSZZ Solidarity), expected 20 percent, but his party won about 5 percent. More realistic predictions turned out to be those of Deputy Cimoszewicz, who expected 10-15 percent, and of the leader of the Liberal-Democratic Congress, Donald Tusk, who predicted the results accurately (7-9 percent; his party won 7 percent) but had hoped for a higher rank—the third among parties in the Sejm (actually it turned out to be the seventh).

To be sure, Deputy Kuron did not want to make any predictions, but there is no doubt that, throughout the electoral campaign, his Democratic Union had aimed somewhat higher and expected that its standing as a leader in the reform cabinet and a leader of the post-Solidarity coalition would be unquestioned. If, however, we consider that the KLD (Liberal-Democratic Congress) and personally Premier Bielecki [a KLD member] had to repulse attacks by all the opposition forces (including those represented in the government) clamoring for a more equitable distribution of the burden of economic restructuring, revival of the state-owned industry and affording it a chance to survive, greater intervention by the state in the economy, and greater state support for entitlements, the electoral results achieved by the KLD are to be viewed as a major success. After all, before J.K. Bielecki became prime

minister, that party used to consist a mere handful of founders, whereas now it has become an authentic political party exerting a genuine influence.

We believe that the sequence of "surprises" should be complemented with one more: namely, the society did not support the raucous extremist nationalist parties promoting anti-Semitic slogans!

In sum, the surprises demonstrate that, on the eve of the elections, the influence of the political elites on the society was overestimated, as was the influence of the president on the voters, and also the influence of the Catholic Church (which proved to be not as extensive as intended).

Who With Whom?

The basic question is: can anything be put together with these scattered building blocks? In democratic systems if no party wins a definite majority, the right to form a coalition usually belongs to the strongest grouping. In our conditions that would be the Democratic Union. The politicians of that party, after proclaiming advance election forecasts, expressed readiness to engage in coalition talks. But as more precise election results began to come in, it turned out that the Union's numerical predomination over other parties is not that great, and that its role as the formative center of a future coalition can thus be readily questioned by other groupings. Thus we have an added problem, since it is not inconceivable that at least two or three other parties will simultaneously try to form postelection alliances. In this event the president's support may prove decisive, but the Democratic Union is not very likely to receive that support. The Union's symbolic electoral victory will certainly be of no major importance when the next appointments [to the president's cabinet] are made.

On scrutinizing the parliamentary mosaic one finds it quite hard to discern any common denominator that would serve to build a progovernment majority. Could the common Solidarity past of many parties be that denominator? In mathematical terms all the groupings admitting their Solidarity origin account for somewhat more than one-half of all the seats in the parliament. But the political and programmatic breakup of the Solidarity movement is already so advanced that the seams would burst if an attempt to form a coalition were to be made. How can the Democratic Union (UD), the Center Accord [POC], NSZZ Solidarity, and the KLD, not to mention the ZChN [Christian-National Union] as well, adopt a united front? Besides, this time the voters were not voting for Solidarity (it could even be said that they were voting against it), and hence forming some "Solidarity coalition" would be abusing the will of the voters. The ethos of Solidarity seems too weak to shore up any future ruling coalition.

Perhaps then Christian values could be the binding glue of the coalition? Several substantial (in terms of the number of their parliamentary seats) groupings are viewed as Christian-democratic (the POC, the WAK,

Peasant Accord, Christian Democracy, and, to some extent, also the KPN and NSZZ Solidarity). Together they might perhaps have enough mandates to form a majority coalition, with the reservation, however, that "Christian values" are difficult to translate in terms of a coherent government program, especially in the economic domain. Nevertheless, given the support of the president and the Episcopate, such a coalition appears possible, but any conflict, for example, between the UD and Peasant Accord, or between the UD and the KPN, would threaten a collapse of such an alliance—and yet in such a coalition the number of possible foci of conflict would be much greater.

In theory it is possible to form two or three minority coalitions gaining the "thematic" support of extragovernmental groupings. One center of such alignments could be an alliance of the current and previous ruling parties (the UD and the KLD), or of the existing opposition (the WAK, the POC, and the KPN). The peasant movement turned out to win so few votes that it cannot play any major role as a factor in forming a coalition; this also applies to the so-called post-Solidarity Left, which actually suffered an electoral defeat, especially compared with the extremely good results scored by the SLD and the PSL.

The postelection parliamentary alignment offers a ripe field for all kinds of speculation, for experimentally putting together building blocks in various ways. Yet it can be plainly seen that no future coalition alignment will guarantee stability of the executive branch. A parliament in which the strongest party has not even 14 percent of the seats is not conducive to efficient government. This accounts for the demands to form a more or less extraparlimentary government supported by the authority of the president and tolerated by a Sejm aware of its weakness.

The First Term of the New Sejm

Activating the machinery of the Sejm and forming a government is at present the greatest challenge to the political elites. Judging from the initial reactions of representatives of these elites, this is an impossible task. It is to be hoped that, as time passes, reflections upon what had really happened in Poland on 27 October will prompt politicians to assess the situation objectively.

These October elections were the second free elections following last year's presidential ones. They provide the second lesson of the young Polish democracy and, like the first, they point to similar conclusions. After 27 October there is no longer any doubt that the period of Solidarity rule is over, this time for good (to be sure, that had been proclaimed several times before, but prematurely—during the presidential elections both Solidarity candidates [Mazowiecki and Walesa] had not seriously expected outside competitors to win). This time the Solidarity groupings, taken together, gained only a little less than 50 percent of the votes.

The era of the domination of that great sociopolitical movement is ending, but the nature of the forces and structures that will fill the vacuum thus left is still not definitely known. The political parties remain weak (consider that the Alliance of the Democratic Left, e.g., consists of more than 15 groupings, organizations, and trade unions), and they often lack any national organization of their own and consist solely of small groups of members and, lacking their own base of social support, are supported in the elections by an electorate of a rather nebulous nature. And often their principal problem is the absence of any political philosophy that would make their programs of action persuasive and specific and endow with a higher meaning their tactics and personnel policies. That is also because chaos of the party declarations, disputes, and interparty alliances mystifying the voters during the electoral campaign became so extensive as to be a topic in itself.

The first free parliamentary elections in post-Communist Poland also serve to sum up the historical road traveled by all the political parties and groupings. It is characteristic that the traditional parties that used to be strong and important during the Second Republic [1919-39], such as the National Democrats and the Socialists, have not revived in proportion to their aspirations (meaning that the fact of their existence was not affirmed by the voters). Admittedly, so far as the peasant movement is concerned, some continuation can be spoken of, but here the matter is more complicated because the strongest peasant grouping, the PSL, is based on the former ZSL [a pro-Communist party, United Peasant Party]. Thus the legacy of the People's Republic of Poland has proved to be stronger than the traditions of the Second Polish Republic, even though no room could be found for the Democratic Party [also a former ally of the Communists], while the old PAX [a "progressive" Catholic party], dexterous as always, succeeded in riding on the coattails of the new victors.

This reaffirms the belief that the Third Republic, while poetically emphasizing its links to the Second, is a child of the People's Republic of Poland above all. And the new parties which have emerged in the last decade and in the last few years and months also remain in solely nostalgic contact with the ancient past. Present-day and future politics can no longer be patterned on the past. The so-called post-Communist Left has already succeeded in learning this lesson, which has yet to be learned by all the participants in democracy in Poland. All the parties without exception were taught a lesson in humility. If that lesson is grasped, we shall perhaps not lose these elections.

Commentary on Transitional Stage in Army

92EP0062A *Poznan WPROST in Polish No 39*,
29 Sep 91 pp 15-18

[Article by Przemyslaw Berg and Kazimierz Pytko: "A Farewell to the Saber"]

[Text] The Polish army is completely unprepared in the face of the new political situation; we should do

everything to hasten the return of Soviet troops behind the Bug River. We have to be ready at any moment to destroy any unit that may refuse to subordinate itself to the Polish authorities.

Under the horrendous and blood-dripping scenario of warfare scripted for dozens of years chiefly in Moscow, the Polish army was to attack completely inoffensive Denmark.

The Warsaw Pact generals had been as late as until the mid-1980's cleverly constructing fundamentally just one model of probable conflict: It was to be a total conflict prompting an armed confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers. Of course, the Warsaw Pact troops would be better and faster—that was what the scenario envisaged. At the right moment "our" elite units would carry out a massed preemptive attack on the enemy and annihilate him. It was expected that our first such enemy would be Denmark and northern Germany, one of the reasons being that our military doctrine was of an offensive nature.

At present we have a fairly large number of tanks, 3,000, and they are relatively modern. T-72 tanks have parameters comparable to the German "Leopards." Military experts likewise give a good grade to armored personnel carriers, of which we have a total of about 4,000 (including 1,500 modern BWP's [Infantry Combat Vehicles]).

All these ambitious plans, scenarios, and strategies have, however, and fortunately, gone astray, and the Warsaw Pact collapsed without a single shot being fired, and there will be no preemptive massed strikes any more. At the same time we have become militarily independent, or, in other words, we are now left on our own, relying solely on our own concepts and forces, with an army that is, to be sure, large, numbering nearly 300,000, but one that is hopelessly equipped, dependent almost entirely on the arms industry of a disintegrating big power. Thus we are left with an army that had been throughout the entire postwar history directed by some outside higher general staffs and which is only nowadays beginning to forge an outline of a strategy of its own.

In 1990 our doctrine was turned around 180 degrees and at present it is exclusively defense-oriented; thus, it does not provide for using our army outside our national boundaries. In this situation a reorganization of forces has become indispensable.

We have at present seven full divisions and six so-called cadre divisions and equipment bases that can be turned into normal combat divisions as the need arises. In connection with the turnabout in military doctrine, these divisions were reinforced with air-defense and antitank subunits. The firepower of a Polish mechanized division is at present comparable to the firepower of similar units in the West.

Focusing on defensive operations requires reorganizing the national air-defense system. We are in the best possible situation regarding our radar systems. The radar stations developed by Polish experts meet the most up-to-date world standards. We are producing two-thirds of that equipment on our own; within the next five years we should attain nearly complete self-sufficiency. Most of the radar stations are sited in western Poland. Previously they were integrated with the radar system of the Warsaw Pact, which resulted in that we used to receive from the GDR army and Soviet units stationed behind the Odra River information on targets incoming from the West. Fortunately, the level of sophistication of Polish R&D units is such that this gap can be rapidly filled. The costs of relocating [eastward, to the Polish-Soviet border] radar systems from one region to another are relatively low.

Identifying the danger is only the first element of the game. It is much more important to destroy the target. But with what? Our air force has barely 480 planes and 40 helicopters (in comparison the USSR has 8,200 planes and 4,000 helicopters). The requirements of the modern battlefield are in principle met only by the Soviet MiG-29 fighters, comparable to the American F-16's. But we have few of them. Only one Polish air force squadron operates aircraft of this type. The equally few SU-22 assault planes are getting good marks as well. As for all our other aircraft, they originate from the 1960's and early 1970's and are in a largely worn condition. The helicopter problem is the worst: 40 helicopters—Mi-24, Mi-17, and Mi-14—are practically all we have, and while very maneuverable, their armament leaves something to be desired.

As for our air defense artillery, it is Soviet equipped, just like our entire air force, which in practice makes it fully dependent on deliveries from the USSR.

As for the availability of what is the most important weapon nowadays—missiles—the situation in our army is catastrophic. Our air defense units are equipped with obsolete Soviet Neva, Volkhov, and Strelka missiles. We lack any automatic missile guidance systems. As for antimissile systems, so indispensable to defense, such as the American "Patriot," they are simply unattainable.

Before the war there used to be a song, "Our Navy, small though it be, faithfully guards Poland's portals." Nowadays we cannot count on the Navy. It is the weakest among the navies operating on the Baltic. Some experts suggest that, after all, the Danish Navy has smaller firepower. We have: one destroyer, three submarines (Dzik, Orzel, and Wilk), four missile ships, and eight PT boats. Our greatest naval strength was, in accordance with the requirements of the defense-offense doctrine, represented by 23 landing ships. They were to take part in the counterstrike on the Danish islands. Nowadays they are being gradually withdrawn from operation. The renowned "Blue Berets" also have become partially dispensable and reduced in strength from a division to a brigade. On this occasion let us note that a similar fate

met the "Red Berets," and in this case the decisive factor was the shortage of equipment, chiefly of transport aircraft and helicopters.

The increasingly modest Polish budget can afford neither the modernization of equipment nor the acquisition of new equipment. Last year we purchased five MiG-29 aircraft, 30 tanks, and 120 antiaircraft missiles. These figures are disturbing. And yet, further budget cuts are being planned and this year's purchases may be even more modest. With the exception of radar equipment and laser-optical aiming systems for tanks (Merida system), all our other fairly modern equipment derives from the USSR, and in the event of any conflict the discontinuation of shipments of spare parts would quite rapidly immobilize our army, which is completely unprepared for the new geopolitical situation that requires both restructuring and dislocations. The only question is where to get the money for it.

Even more important questions are those concerning the very foundations, that is, the doctrine, and namely: What in general is the future Polish army to be like? For what dangers should it be prepared? And how should it adapt itself to such dangers?

The expert on military doctrine Colonel Professor Stanislaw Koziej, commander-dean of the Department of Land Troops, Academy of National Defense, said, "I believe that our most important task is to develop our own strategy of national defense, our own defense doctrine. Of course, that is an extremely difficult task, comparable to that faced by the military and politicians in 1918 at the dawn of the Second Republic. Consider also the mentality handicap due to the prolonged lack of national independence. During the years of its membership in the Warsaw Pact our army was a mere cog in a big machine, with the concepts and strategies always being received from outside. The others were doing the thinking for us, and the only thing expected of us was that, in an emergency, we would willingly serve as cannon fodder.

"The concept of developing our own defense doctrine comprises several lasting elements. First there is an objective assessment of the dangers. The ability to identify continually and thoroughly sites of probable attack has to be developed. At the same time, a strategy has to be developed for preventing outbreaks of conflicts, with both the military and the politicians playing an equally important role. If, however, there is a considerable likelihood of failure to master the conflict by peaceful means, one has to know the forces that are needed to counteract the enemy and the optimal ways of utilizing these forces. Assessment of the danger is always the most important element of the entire conflict.

"In the near future," Prof. Koziej continued, "let us say in the 1990's, we should take into account four kinds of danger. First, the danger of a large-scale total war with some adjoining big power (Germany, the post-Soviet

state). Such a conflict is the least likely, but its eventuality cannot be completely precluded. In this event victory in the war is impossible, of a certainty; at most, defense can be maximally prolonged so as to cause the aggressor to suffer maximum losses.

"The armed forces should, as a last resort, merge with a nationwide resistance movement.

"The next and most likely danger is a limited local conflict with one of our smaller neighbors. That may be an atypical conflict of low combat intensity, which will not necessarily engage entire armies all at once. Here the objective should be to eliminate the conflict as soon as possible and, if the need arises, to carry out a rapid defensive-offensive operation. In such a situation we would be entirely on our own. The third kind of danger may be threatened by the Soviet troops stationed in this country and on the territory of the former GDR. This possibility has to be considered, without, of course, presuming in advance that these troops are hostilely disposed toward us. But since there exists the possibility of the outbreak of acute conflicts inside the USSR, it has to be considered that these troops will want to join in the action. Next, suppose that discipline among these troops completely disintegrates, that they will engage in random acts of violence and behave provocatively, and so forth. In that event our actions should be confined to assisting, convoying, protecting, and, if the need arises, separating quarreling units. We should do everything to expedite the return of these troops to the USSR. At the same time, we should be ready at any moment to isolate and annihilate any unit that may refuse to subordinate itself to the Polish authorities.

"And lastly it should be considered that a collective security system will arise in Europe one day and that Poland will be part of that system. There exists the possibility of the outbreak of a conflict somewhere on the margin of the continent, or elsewhere in the world, in which a defensively united Europe may want to take part. We must be prepared to participate in that operation; we must be ready to provide a suitable troop contingent for ancillary or combat operations.

"To provide for all the possibilities presented above, we must have a strong, well-equipped, professional army of not more than 150,000. The size of the armed forces is, at least in European countries, shrinking steadily, and most of these countries aspire for that size to equal 0.3 to 0.5 percent of their population. Germany, for example, intends to have an army of only 370,000 by the mid-1990's (given its population of 80 million, that is less than 0.5 percent), while the British are reducing their troops even more."

The modern smaller army is strong owing to two factors: equipment and training. It has to be a volunteer army, equipped with the most up-to-date weaponry and staffed for the most part with career military. Any other model, and in particular that of the levee en masse with obsolete

arms and poorly trained soldiers who, as a rule, are either hostile or indifferent toward the military, will no longer work nowadays.

Experts estimate that in the mid-1990's the Polish army will be 200,000-strong and by the end of the decade its size will shrink to 150,000. In general, it is assumed that the armed forces of a country like Poland should consist of two parts: the territorial units, consisting mostly of draftees and equipped with the simplest arms, and the professional operating units of the military districts, provided with heavy equipment and specialized armaments, as well as units in the reserve of the supreme commander, consisting of elite rapid reaction forces and

the air force. That second group of units should consist of the career military alone.

It is expected, however, that, given in its present one-third "professionalized" extent, the Polish army cannot be entirely "professionalized" even by the end of the 1990's. It is simply that we still cannot afford a modern cadre army, because creating it is both a complicated and a costly undertaking. Of course, it is not that at present we are entirely defenseless. In the future, however, if we do not take steps to modernize thoroughly our armed forces and if, God forbid, we meet with some military misfortune, we may once again suffer from self-delusion [a reference to Poland's military defeat in 1939].

GSD Roundtable on Causes, Effects of Miners Riots

92BA0091A Bucharest '22' in Romanian 18-25 Oct 91
pp 6, 7

[Unattributed article: "Anarchic Violence and Democracy Are Incompatible"]

[Text] On Thursday, 17 October, a roundtable was held at the GDS [Group for Social Dialogue] headquarters on the topic: "Violence: Causes, Responsibilities, Solutions." The roundtable was attended by GDS members, numerous guests from the Ministries of Interior and Justice, and the Trade Union Cartel ALFA, as well as university lecturers, deputies, sociologists, and lawyers.

Doru Cosma: We should direct our attention to the causes that led to the outbreak of the recent violence, establish, as much as possible, the responsibilities of all the factors who contributed to it, and possibly suggest remedies. The September events seriously harmed not only the process of democratization of the country, but also our image abroad. We risk becoming Europe's barbarians. But, with the exception of the legionnaire [Iron Guards] movement which used assassination to resolve what it viewed as acute problems, in the modern history of the Romanian society and its political life no political parties or social groups have been known to use acts of collective violence like the ones recorded in the past two years. It remains to be seen whether these eruptions of violence and their causes shouldn't be sought in the much too long communist regime.

Claudiu Iordache: One of the legacies of 50 years of communism was a perfect condition of mediocrity of the Romanian society. At this time the Romanian citizen understands the fact that he has failed in this legacy and that he is immobilized in it. Twenty months after having lived the sensation of opening up, the Romanian society as a whole realizes that it is also immobilized. In the final analysis, only the power apparatus has remained intact, and it is the source of order and disorder in Romania. For a while we lived with the illusion that we could offer an equivalent power in the other direction, but we are incapable of that. What is to be done in order to unblock the society at a time when we are not managing to have a Romanian political class? When we are not succeeding in creating a political life? When we are failing to impose divergent or convergent currents that may allow our people to breathe a different air than they now do? All kinds of tensions accumulate in a blocked society. The fact that people are fighting in the streets, families are disintegrating, and the progressive impoverishment—which recently has become downright brutal—leaves people exposed and unprotected, explains why any kind of violence is possible at any time. Violence should have run against social systems capable of taking it and changing it into something else. After all, violence is a short circuit in an energy incapable of becoming something creative.

We didn't succeed in defeating the power mechanism inherited either by street fighting or political struggle. All that's left is the solution of seducing it into generating the same power, but channeled in another direction than it has been until now. If we examine the architecture of this national unhappiness we see that the Romanians are not inferior to other citizens of Europe, but the Romanian institutions are inferior to the institutions operating in any Western country. The Romanian vojvods didn't build institutions, they built cathedrals. The problem of institutions is fundamental, because what use will it be to soon have a constitution while the state institutions—nonexistent, inhibited, or mock institutions—cannot react when the miners descend on Bucharest. And the miners come because they inhabit Romania's only ghetto. Either the right or the left can at any time pick up these people's energy and channel it toward the capital city. The miners are a blind force waiting for a signal to immediately make themselves available to any authority.

How are we to seduce the systems with which the current regime faces us? I'll give you an example. I know the interior minister: Doru Viorel Ursu is a special person when you talk to him, but as soon as he begins to discharge his ministerial duties he becomes vulnerable if not actually embarrassing. He is a political subject. Our police is not free of political pressures, just as our Army and judiciary are not protected from such pressure. There is no separation of powers in the state. The political arm exerts an extraordinary pressure on the judiciary, for example, which is blackmailed to the utmost. We have not penetrated inside these institutions and their present is uncertain because there are no solutions for developing them.

Violence is an effect, while the judiciary is a means. But the responsibility falls on the Power. Our Power is content to correct the effects, rather than the causes. At this time I know everyone who is a political figure in Romania and believe me, I'm not saying this to provoke, but as an admission of humiliation: these people are extremely mediocre. They cannot represent Romania. Our political parties offer a sorry show, the outcome of bad stage direction, and the people grow distant and cold as they watch this political spectacle from an increasing distance. The situation is already such that violence can return to our society any moment. Solutions will be found to eliminate the violence only when the men of this country will decide to conduct politics in the true sense of the word. Violence is actually the manifestation of the nonfulfillment and lack of involvement of people who commit acts of violence in order to simulate involvement.

Iustin Stanco, lieutenant colonel at the Ministry of the Interior: I want to bring to your attention several personal views on the causes of the recent and other acts of violence. First, I will cite the phenomenon of social and economic disorganization, a phenomenon that usually accompanies and marks the etiology and genesis of

crime. The very rapid change that our society is undergoing—the transition from a dictatorial system to a democratic society—is marked by a phenomenon of social disorganization and it is up to the state institutions and the entire body of social organizations to ensure that the duration of this phenomenon is as short as possible. As one of its component elements I want to emphasize the legislative and moral anomie, that is, the initial absence of legal regulations and the legislative vacuum, and later the fact that the legislation accomplished is insufficiently supported by the masses and insufficiently known to the public. And now I would like to move on to the domain of social control theory and its flaws. From that viewpoint it is clear that the state institutions, including the one to which I belong, were marked by the opportunity to achieve the institutionalized social control that they were expected to exercise. First of all, the Interior Ministry did not exercise appropriate social control. A first concurring factor was that after the purges the personnel left in the Interior Ministry held themselves responsible. As is well known, before the revolution the forces of public order were compelled to organize and pursue their activities according to a concept whose main characteristic was its identification with the ideology and arbitrary political orientations of the party-state rather than with the principle of the supremacy of the law. While at one stage the forces of order and their representatives, or certain sections thereof, were involved in repressing the leaders or members of the historical parties, later, as a result of the impact of the same ideology and policy suborned to the party *nomenklatura*, the Interior Ministry's activities were diverted from its real social mission, something that had a negative effect on the operation of the civic society and on promoting and implementing the basic human rights and liberties; all that caused Romania to be internationally labeled as a police state. Which is what it was. On the other hand, once the old institutionalized structures were challenged and deep-seated accumulations of social frustrations began to relax, sections of the public, the mass media, and certain parties and groups unleashed and kept up a genuine campaign of undifferentiated stigmatization of the Interior Ministry organizational structures and personnel that affected its capacity of action and intervention. Another factor is the perspective of mass psychosociology. Circumstances like those we recently experienced demonstrate that human actions are channeled not so much by reason as by affect or emotions. As for the means of understanding and controlling violence, the Interior Ministry intends to expand and update the education of our personnel in the areas of social psychology, sociology, delinquency, and deviance.

Going back to the responsibility of the Interior Ministry in the recent events: I don't wish to talk about the law, but I do want to stress that the Policemen Statute adopted by a UN resolution in 1979 expressly envisages restrictions on the use of force for restoring public order. There are four principles that must be observed in such cases: The first is containment—using force only when

necessary; proportion—using force only if it is proportionate to the intensity of the force opposed; progressiveness—taking gradual measures, beginning with the least violent and progressing to actions imposed by intensive violence; and last but not least, the nonsurprise principle—meaning issuing repeated warnings about the use of force. In my opinion, those principles were observed during the most recent miners' riots.

Pavel Campeanu: While examining the context of the violence and the hypothesis that this violence may be an outcome of our society's coming away from a communist regime, we cannot ignore the question, why are all the other former communist countries managing to do so without violence? Consequently, this hypothesis doesn't seem at all fruitful to me and even less of a conclusion. As a second context it may be well to consider the French Revolution and other violent revolutions. Almost two years after 14 July 1789, France was doing much worse than that present Romania from the viewpoint of violence. Violent revolutions were and are paid for by a disruption of social relations difficult to mend. A violent revolution involves a decisive regulation of the social relations against the law, by violence. Thus, violence becomes the decisive means of regulating the social relations; the problem is that recovering the ability to replace this kind of regulators takes time. After all, the transition from a natural order to a social order is the transition from the free exercise of violence to regulation violence. No society can forswear violence or its regulation. Violence is regulated on an institutional, legal, and moral basis. The miners incident seems to me very specific and it is difficult to find comparisons because, from the viewpoint of their role in this society, the miners have taken over the role of the state. In every modern society the state has a monopoly on the legal exercise of violence. In our country, the miners hold the monopoly on violence. They so forcefully regulated the social relations by violence that they brought about what the relation between the state institutions and the political parties failed to bring about, namely, the ouster of a government that needed to be replaced by another that I am not sure it should replace. Thus, as long as the state has not recovered the monopoly on the exercise of force, we risk a recurrence of the same. What I'm saying may sound paradoxical and sad, because it implies the idea that we need to consolidate the state. Personally, I am no admirer of the state, and therefore I'm not happy to be saying this, but in my profession, the joy or sorrow of its practitioner play no role.

Another aspect in connection with the violence in our country is that it does not represent an incident, but is the manner in which, beginning with December 1989, we have been settling fundamental social and political issues. The third characteristic is that the violence is exercised not only outside and against the law, but also without any legal consequences. We experienced a revolution, had more than 1,000 killed, but have no killer; we experienced Tirgu Mures, where it seems that the major criminals were the Gypsies, according to the Helsinki

reports; we experienced 13-15 June, for which the miners were not punished, and now it remains to be seen what will happen to those responsible for September 1991. As long as one social group can practice violence under the privilege of immunity, that is an invitation to continue this kind of regulation of social relations. This is all the more grave as it is occurring at the beginning of an electoral campaign whose debut was marked by such threatening signs. This electoral campaign should rescue our chances of democracy, and these chances depend on how the elections will proceed.

I would like to make two remarks, this time of a political order. The press has carried an appeal by the PAC [Civic Alliance Party] for participation in the event commemorating the student killed. I wholeheartedly regret the death of this young man. On the other hand, I can only rely on verifiable facts. This appeal was referring to the criminal acts of repression of the authorities. I don't know whether any repression can be anything but criminal, but this is a matter of style. But I do know that repression is a brutal action carried out by the state and initiated by the state; I also know that, in the case of the miners, the word repression is open to doubt, because it seems that the violence was unleashed by the miners.

The second remark concerns the Presidency. The Presidency, which is the supreme magistracy in the state, is behaving in a manner that is affirming the powerlessness of the state to recover its monopoly over the legal exercise of violence. One year ago the president thanked the initiators of illegal violence and sided with them, while this year they signed a communique together. Asked why he did it, the president responded that in politics one has to make compromises. In my opinion, the supreme magistrate, the head of state, has no right to make compromises, certainly not with illegal violence. Consequently, what I would suggest is the need to categorically disavow any form of illegal or excessive violence.

Gabriel Andreescu: I think that what we should be talking about is not so much the miners' riots but the events that occurred at the end of September, because we are discussing an area that must be considered in its whole dimension and in relation to which the topic of violence appears more differentiated, as it is in reality. The miners' violence was followed by actions carried out by state institutions which acted alternately naturally and unnaturally. There was, for example, the declaration of Gheorghe Gavrilescu, a member of the GID [Independent Group for Democracy] and the Civic Alliance, who was arrested on 28 September by a patrol of the Police Station No. 3, was rough-handed during the arrest, and was beaten up at the police station. This display of violence was evidently designed to impress and intimidate, and was accompanied by questions such as, why was he against the Communists and communism, and by repeated death threats. Gheorghe Gavrilescu is not an isolated case. We have among us a trade union leader who will have an opportunity to recall his own experience. Along this line I think we need to overcome this

dichotomy concerning the relation between the state and violence and the relation between citizens and violence, because in a society organized in this way, the legitimacy of violence differs from one case to the next. The state itself, its institutions, and those who represent those institutions are in their turn subject to the law, which presents a moral nature and dimension. This network of responsibilities is perhaps the most difficult aspect to regulate after a revolution, but the regulation must not come at the detriment of one of the two components mentioned, at the detriment of the state, as the miners did, and not at the detriment of the citizen, as the Interior Ministry and other institutions of the Power unfortunately did, and not just at the end of September 1991.

Constantin Juganaru, Trade Union Confederative Alliance 15 November: Regarding what the colonel—next to whom I'm seated now as I was yesterday in Calea Rahovei in the presence of police personnel—was saying, it is not only a matter of physical violence, but also of psychological violence, which is also important. I'll tell you about my case. Policemen came to my home, walked around the apartment building, came upstairs, and said out loud on the landing that I was summoned for penal questioning. It is one thing to be summoned and to go to the police, and another to have the neighbors hear that you're summoned for penal questioning. They summoned me for 0800 and I sat there two hours for nothing. And all this time no one told me why I had been summoned; I lost my patience and I asked. They told me it was for some information about the 24-27 September events. I had no statement to make. I was sent back to wait some more and to think some more, then outside it was hinted that I may be detained if I didn't make a statement. All the information I was asked about concerned the date of 27 September, the day on which we held an organized meeting in Revolution Square. "With whom were you, what did you do, what slogans were shouted?" The last and worst thing for me—after the talks ended and I was still not told why I had been summoned—they took me into one room, took pictures, took my fingerprints, then tossed me out without even allowing me to wash my hands.

Bogdan Hossu, National Trade Union Cartel ALFA: The violence must be viewed in the historical context of the aftermath of the revolution. Just as the former government claimed that social justice could not be achieved because that would violate democracy (meaning that a law to reinstate the pensions of the old *nomenklatura* members would violate democracy, notwithstanding the developments until that pension), it seems equally abnormal to me to talk about violence in a state that should be democratic. I'm saying this because what the miners were violently demanding had been democratically requested by five trade union confederations at the negotiations table. A resignation was a normal outcome. The idea that we don't live in a democratic state comes from the upper echelons, from the apparatus. It is dangerous to talk of a state monopoly on violence when

the state mechanisms are not working. Does it seem normal to you that when someone reports a violation of democratic principles or of the law, he should be attacked and molested, while the police claims not to be able to find the assailant? The man must have beaten himself up and broken his sternum and stayed two months in the hospital for fun. And when the prosecutor's office was notified, it responded that the incident itself was outside its competence. It's easy to say that violence is not democratic, but when you do use democratic methods and find that although you are right, although you represent someone, the state mechanisms are nevertheless not wielded and don't work, there is a wall of silence and despair there and people think to themselves: It's now or never, it doesn't matter, I may die, but he'll die with me! The lower rungs are fully exposed to such threats, and it is undisputable to us that the law works only for a certain group of people. To demand justice now, after the miners' fourth raid, forgetting everything that happened, is totally abnormal. I listened to you, Colonel, but when there's talk of legality, we would like the trade unions law to be implemented, too, especially the paragraph that says any threat or intimidation in the organization of trade union structures is punishable by six months to two years imprisonment.

Andrei Cornea: In the past two years our tendency has been to seek scapegoats who are evidently anyone but us. I would like us to be able to go beyond the level of presenting these extremely regrettable cases of attacks on people, threats, and intimidation. They exist, they are very damaging and explosive, but this is not the time to talk about them. The problem is that we all think we know what democracy means; we think we know very well what a civilized state means. In reality we don't know, and you, the trade unions, don't quite know that even if 10 large groups get together and demand the resignation of the prime minister or the government, and they have every right to demand it, it's still not democratic that the prime minister and his government should resign. You may negotiate various things, you have every right to your opinion, you may accuse the government of every possible evil—if you can prove it—but to think that the government is behaving illegally because it's not resigning, that is not democracy. The sad thing is that everyone thinks that when a violent force or one with violent tendencies represents our own ideas and political aversions, that force is just. If we act like that, we risk creating a vicious circle from which we'll never break out. Imagine, for example, that President Iliescu—who is undoubtedly a political midget—had resigned. His place would have been taken by Mr. Alexandru Barladeanu, and I'm not sure that would have been an improvement. Let's assume that Alexandru Barladeanu had resigned, too, and that his place had been taken by the most capable person in this country—I cannot come up with a name, but let's assume. Well, imagine that half a year later the miners had come again, or perhaps not the miners, but the drivers, or railway workers, or the metro workers, and so forth. The basic issue of democracy is

that we must clearly distinguish between the person, who may be undeserving or below the dignity of his office, and the institution. Here Mr. Iordache is perfectly right. Romania lacks an institutional tradition. I will go even farther. In the past century it has been demonstrated—Gandhi was not a nobody—that nonviolent action by determined and courageous people is effective even against authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

Pavel Campeanu: I would like to point out something. I hope we agree that a society cannot survive without a minimum of social order. Such order is achieved through a legal distribution of social roles and duties. While the despair of certain people in certain circumstances is understandable, it does not mean that despair gives rights. The fact that I may be desperate does not give me a right to go out and exercise violence against whoever I think is responsible for my despair, regardless of whether I'm right or wrong. After all, there exist models of democratic societies characterized by, among other things, the fact that violence is controlled. A democratic society cannot be based on the free exercise of violence. In order to make progress we must strengthen the state not in the sense of allowing it to recover only its prerogatives, but in the sense of creating a state that deserves and is capable of winning our trust thanks to the manner in which it wields these prerogatives. We may not confuse the state—which is a permanent feature of the society—with a transitional power. We may destroy a power, but we must not destroy the state. However, as opposed to other countries in which the state power was replaced, the 1989 revolution marked the destruction of the state. We must rebuild a state deserving of our trust and capable of exercising its prerogatives. Persevering in violence will not help us make progress toward democracy. Anarchical violence and democracy are incompatible.

Mihai Sora: There are frequent references to the number of votes won by the FSN [National Salvation Front] and the president on 20 May. However, a power derives legitimacy from another factor, in addition to votes. That second factor is the mandate. The mandate restricts, perhaps not always because of the thinking process of the incumbent, but because of the promises of the future incumbent who pledges to follow a certain policy. Is the incumbent authorized to change the policy once he has received a restricting mandate? I am referring to the fact that the FSN received those 65 percent for a promise made once verbally and several times by other means, proceeding from an inherited and cultivated confusion between a single party—in this case not a monolithic party but a party incorporating pluralism within it—which was the same as the state. Having at some point declared itself a political party and having entered the electoral competition, the Front proceeded to use all the resources of the state. It raised salaries, reduced the working week, filled the stores, stopped exports of foodstuffs, and so forth. All this real, not verbal propaganda was dressed with one slogan: Vote for your peace of mind! The costs of the reform should have

been publicly discussed, all the more since already in January there existed, if not a reform law, at least a draft in two versions, one with very harsh costs and the other with fairly painful costs.

The policy could have been decided overtly. A state of culpability has been created in which, while it is true that the guilt of each member of the society is very great, the guilt of the Power is doubly so. First, because it too is a member of this society, and second, because it holds the power. The problem of responsibility was raised at one point. In this combination of everything, is it possible to speak of precise guilt? There exists a network of guilt in which the responsibilities were distributed in such a manner that in the end they disappeared and don't fall on anyone. That is why people keep shouting: Down with Iliescu! Because he is the only visible person who acts as a magnet for everything. Until the Power frankly and publicly assumes responsibility amid this confusion in which there is no truth and no morality, all these lessons and questions, like, what is democracy, are nothing but sterile lessons and academic questions.

Military Government Needed To Restore Order

92BA0097B Bucharest ROMANIA MARE in Romanian
4 Oct 91 p 1

["Text" of Romania Mare Party Declaration sent to the media on 28 September and signed by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, president; Eugen Barbu, first vice president; Prof. Mircea Musat, vice president; retired Air Force Col. Radu Theodoru, vice president; and retired Lt. Gen. Theodor Paraschiv, executive secretary: "Declaration of the Romania Mare Party Regarding the Serious Events in Our Country"]

[Text] Recognizing the general deterioration of the socio-political situation in our country, the Directing Committee of the Romania Mare Party declares the following:

- 1) We firmly proclaim ourselves against all acts of violence, independently of who is committing them.
- 2) The fourth arrival of the miners in Bucharest can be assessed only with respect to the other previous practices. Whoever called them at that time has championed a policy of intimidation which today has turned against the initiators.
- 3) We consider that the major cause that has triggered the present state of conflict is the contrived reform and all the irregular measures that have led to censurable circumstances such as: the population's impoverishment, the emergence and growth of unemployment, the unprecedented escalation of prices, the shattering of the national currency; in brief, economic debacle and the degradation of culture, science, and basic institutions.
- 4) We express our regret that the president of Romania, the Parliament, the government, and other organs of state power did not take all the legal steps that were

absolutely needed to avoid reaching this point. During Wednesday, 25 September, together with the arrival of the miners in Bucharest, two events occurred that cannot be justified in a true democracy: Ion Iliescu maintained an unaccountable silence for 21 hours, and about 100 "people's choices" were absent from Parliament. Together with public opinion, we ask ourselves: With the exception of Valeriu Butulescu, the delegate from Hunedoara, what did the senators and delegates from the Valea Jiului area do? Why did they not concern themselves in time to prevent this explosive situation and to fulfill their obligations toward the workers whose trust they violated?

5) The entire public opinion was dismayed to see how the pair of young novice politicians, Petre Roman and Doru Viorel Ursu, skirted a dialogue and refused to perceive the real dimensions of the situation, and how they saw fit to answer the miners' desperate cry for bread with repressive measures. Wanting to retain its seat at any price, the Executive resorted to the most dangerous solution, ordering the repression of the Romanian worker.

In this case, how do today's actions of the Petre Roman government differ from those of the communist power of 1989? We would like to point out that for nearly two years the country's prisons have held military personnel guilty solely of having attempted to defend their objectives with tear gas.

6) We express our total disagreement with the partisan, sluggish, and highly prejudiced position of Romanian Television, which has once more presented events in a distorted manner, permitting itself ironic and inappropriate comments intended to mislead public opinion. This is not the first time that Romanian Television demonstrates that it does not serve the national interest, for which we consider it necessary to immediately replace its management.

7) Analyzing the evolution of events in our country with great lucidity and patriotic responsibility, the Directing Committee of the Romania Mare Party resolutely maintains that the only way to solve the crisis and save the nation is to establish a predominantly military transitional government capable of assuring peace, order, the reconstruction process, real democratization, as well as a seriously threatened territorial sovereignty and integrity. We believe that we would not have proposed this form of government if President Ion Iliescu had assumed his responsibility to stave off this disastrous course of events on which the Petre Roman government has launched the country. It has become clear to all that the country's feudalization has been pursued by contracting for large foreign loans, an act apt to subjugate Romania for a long time, to humiliate the national dignity, and to endanger the future of the Romanian people.

The priority is no longer to save a compromised government and its false democracy, which is increasingly

proving itself to be a devastating anarchy. Before anything else, we must now think about saving the state and our ideals of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. A firm and responsible government is no longer necessitated solely by the domestic situation, but equally as much by foreign circumstances that are particularly dangerous for the Romanian state.

We condemn the superficiality with which those in power and the representatives of some parties treat an event of exceptional risk for the national essence: the constitution of the so-called Transylvanian government in exile, with its seat in Budapest. This cannot be minimalized and it shows that some of politicians cannot or do not want to understand the difficulty of the situation in Transylvania. A small country, devoid of alliances, such as Romania, can do nothing else than call to the country's helm the only unquestionable institution which has proven for 2000 years that it follows the politics of no party and that it does not betray! This institution is Romania's Army, which is not composed of foreign officers, is not an army of occupation, but represents the armed branch of the country. We are appealing to our countrymen's wisdom and patriotism, asking them to remember that during the country's most difficult times, including December 1989, the slogan "The Army is with us!" has echoed as a cheer of relief. My countrymen, have faith in the Army. It is not communist, not FSN [National Salvation Front], not liberal, nor Peasant Party: it is your living shield, wrapped in the flag. If that is not understood now, while it is still not too late, then Romania will disappear from the map.

No stopgap solution, no government of so-called national accessibility, will represent anything else than a palliative, than a postponement of the conclusion. We must place pressure on the wound, the wound produced by our politician's vicious struggle for power, which has given our country a pitiful show for nearly two years.

8) We are adopting a positive attitude against the harmful attempts of some parties and publications to antagonize this country's population, to exhibit as infamous those healthy national forces. We consider it necessary to achieve a true national reconciliation without allowing a political or terrorist organization to exploit events for its own benefit, and without allowing anyone to impose the outlawing of certain parties and the prohibition of certain publications that tell the truth. At the same time, we repudiate the government's risky gamble of equating patriotism and extremism.

9) We demand the immediate cessation of all political trials and the release of those illegally held following the events of December 1989.

10) Lastly, we warmly recommend to President Ion Iliescu, democratically elected by the Romanian nation, to responsibly cooperate with representatives of the Army, with all the patriotic forces of our people, and not only with the parties represented in Parliament. We

nurture the conviction that Romania will survive these trying times with its head held high!

The present Declaration was sent for distribution to the major forms of mass media in Romania on Thursday, 28 September, at 1800 hours.

Brucan Analyzes Poll Ranking Opposition Parties

92BA0088A Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian
15-16 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Silviu Brucan: "Politics and Popularity"]

[Text] The recent IRSOP [Romanian Public Opinion Study Institute] poll provided a picture of the Romanian political spectrum after the miners' raid in September and as such, it confirmed, in broad lines, the previous evaluations made in this column. This time, too, I expect to see a familiar universal political phenomenon: The electoral losers will contest the elections, and in between elections they will contest the poll results.

The National Salvation Front [FSN], which had dropped from 66 percent in May 1990 to about 30 percent this summer, recovered about 4 percent (34 percent) after the miners' crush. Everyone agrees that the miners' incident placed the FSN government in a more favorable light. Even in the marketplace, angry homemakers who until now were letting off steam by cursing Roman, now pity him while waiting for a new target.

However, in the absence of a major political opponent like in the United States, Germany, or Great Britain, what the Front lost was not picked up by one opposition party, but was distributed among several parties, including the new ones created in the meantime. This is how the opposition parties ranked in comparison to the former elections:

	May 1990	October 1991
	Percent	Percent
National Liberal Party [PNL]	6.11	10
National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNT-cd]	2.56	8
Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]	—	7
Civic Alliance Party [PAC]	—	5
UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania]	7.23	4
MER [Ecology Movement of Romania]	2.62	4
Democratic Agrarian Party [PDAR]	1.83	4
Liberal Party (Young Wing)	—	2
Romanian Ecology Party [PER]	1.69	2
Romania Mare Party [PRM]	—	2
PSM (Verdet) [Socialist Labor Party]	—	1
Free Exchange Party [PLS]	—	1

The rest of the parties got under 1 percent.

Thus, a few political conclusions emerge:

1. The PNL is leading the opposition for two reasons: its appeal to businessmen, entrepreneurs, owners of stores and workshops, etc., that is, to the "new class" generated by the market economy, and secondly, its reticence in the matter of using force and violence in the political struggle.
2. The social picture has considerably changed since May 1990. The introduction of a market economy has produced a significant social differentiation among what we used to call the workers class, which doesn't even exist anymore as a large, compact, and homogenous sociological entity. While at the previous elections the industrial workers class voted as a block for the FSN, which after the revolution cultivated and pampered it, splits and shifts have now appeared in its midst, which were in fact reflected within the Front, too. At the same time, the rapid emergence of a middle class, the beneficiary of the changes occurring in the property structure in the urban and rural environments, as well as the emergence of a growing private sector in the economy, are making themselves felt in the political arena.
3. The supporters of the street strategy, favorably inclined to winning the power by force, which suffered a crushing defeat on 20 May 1990, failed to learn the due political lessons. They have still not grasped that a street strategy designed to win the support of a violent, noisy minority is at loggerheads with an electoral strategy apt to bring millions of votes. The citizen's primary motivation at the polls dictates voting for a party capable of governing the country in our present catastrophic situation, and evidently neither the negative-sterile and whining rhetoric, nor the assault on ministries or setting them on fire, nor outbursts of elation about each strike paralyzing the national economy are likely to inspire too much confidence in this respect.
4. The minimal gains recorded by the opposition parties can also be attributed to the fact that they failed to formulate a program alternative clear enough and convincing enough to the masses of citizens. The Romanian electorate, although not too experienced in matters of democracy, are smart enough to ask themselves a legitimate question: If the Roman government was such a disaster and its reform was as bankrupt as the opposition leaders were claiming until recently, why are they now clamoring as one for its continuation?
5. The poll has also confirmed the view that although the extreme right and left-wing parties are very harmful as forces of instigation and disorder, their electoral impact is very weak. In 1992 most of the votes will go to the center, center-left, and center-right, but within this rather broad spectrum substantial variations may occur until then in favor of one party or another. The present opinion poll is one thing, and next spring's poll will be something else.

6. Finally, the UDMR suffered the heaviest loss among the opposition. I recently wrote that the market effects will also make themselves felt among the Hungarian minority as socioeconomic interests will burst beyond the ethnic criterion that dominated the Hungarians' vote in 1990. On the other hand, the extremists perched atop the UDMR are launching separatist slogans rejected by the majority of the Hungarians, who want to live at peace with the Romanians. It is becoming increasingly clear that the opposition of the UDMR extremist leaders was not directed against the FSN government, but against the national structure of the Romanian state; their systematic protests here and abroad (which too frequently were joined by the gullible leaders of newspapers and parties) were in fact not concerned with the democratic rights of the Hungarian minority, which have generally been satisfied, but with dismembering Romania, which is what irredentist circles abroad are tenaciously and slyly pursuing. This is a source of ethnic conflict with a great explosive potential that may seriously affect the 1992 election, especially in Transylvania.

Generally speaking, the IRSOP opinion poll outlined an electoral outcome that will not give the absolute majority to any party, thus making it necessary to form a national unity government based, however, on the real, rather than imaginary weight of each political party. I've said it before and I reiterate: that is the only "national salvation" formula. The new electoral law will necessarily envisage a 4 to 5 percent minimum quota for entering Parliament, with a view to eliminating the frivolous aspect of dozens of parties, many of which are but a family matter or the creation of some millionaire keen on buying a seat in Parliament or in the government. Another salutary effect will be that it will polarize the small political parties that have the same program or political position in the country's politics. What, for example, is the purpose of having two or even three ecological parties in Romania?

Consequently, let us seriously prepare to pass the second grade test in Romania's democracy.

Ratiu Criticizes Parliament, Eyes Presidency

92BA0088B Bucharest *BARICADA* in Romanian
15 Oct 91 p 16

[Interview with Ion Ratiu, chairman of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, by Liviu Valenas; place and date not given: "Does Anyone Want Me To Run?"]

[Text] [Valenas] Mr. Ion Ratiu, I will begin with a question that is becoming trite: How would you describe the current social and political situation in Romania?

[Ratiu] I should begin by talking about the economic situation. The number one problem in Romania is the economic situation, which is becoming increasingly difficult. And if we consider the past summer, which was very wet, clearly many crops will be disastrous, but if we wonder what will happen in winter, then, dear God,

the prospects are very grim; we are at a transition stage that is drawing out greatly; the right to private property is not yet sacred, so to speak, meaning that we don't know for sure what the situation is; the Land Bill was passed, but the land has not yet been distributed (and we're only talking of the agricultural cooperatives, not the state agricultural enterprises, too). As for the commercial and major enterprises, the changes made to date are incapable of leading to a genuine privatization of the national economy. Thus, after having a single center, a pyramid structure with one top viewed as the "economic dictator" that decreed five-year plans, now we have a whole string of "autonomous" managements: at the last counting there were 58 such managements....

[Valenas] In other words, old stuff, new packaging....

[Ratiu] Worse than that, because instead of having a plan, which even though it was more bad than good, it was still something coordinated. Now we have countless uncoordinated "plans." As a result, production dropped 60-80 percent in absolute terms compared to 1989, and the unutilized production capacity increased 50 percent. Inflation is rising and hidden unemployment is spreading at a dizzying speed. The economic situation is desperate, the purchasing power of the leu has collapsed, and we no longer know what to expect....

[Valenas] Should we then expect the Romanian economy to go bankrupt right away?

[Ratiu] I think that the present government is thinking especially about economic aid from the West, in whatever form it may come, as a gift, loans, humanitarian aid, anything is welcome! And the bigger the better! But that is not what will pull us out of the impasse, out of the morass in which we are, or out of the mud of economic disaster. We need massive investments of foreign capital, in other words, we need to bring here people with money to invest, because in Romania they can make a larger profit than if they were currently investing anywhere else in the world! If we manage to accomplish that, then we can pull the country out of the impasse. But if we don't, our situation will get worse and worse!

[Valenas] Despite all its tragicomic efforts, the present government does not have credibility in the West. Do you not think that the opposition serves as merely an alibi for the regime, as some sort of cosmetic touch-up for a government endeavoring to appear "democratic" to the West?

[Ratiu] Whatever we may say, we don't have an organized opposition in Romania! If the West interprets our presence as some sort of alibi for the government, that is a great mistake! We accepted to take our seats in Parliament in order to demonstrate that we are true democrats. Which does not in the least mean that we are cosigners of what the regime is currently doing. The government party is completely in control of Parliament. In other words, we, the opposition, cannot make changes or amendments in the various draft bills, because they are

automatically rejected. Thus, the regime bears the responsibility for the entire legislation! There is no question of any alibi!

[Valenas] If the present Parliament is almost a one-party parliament, that is also because of the frauds, violence, and thefts that occurred during the 20 May 1990 election. What hope is there that the next elections will be free?

[Ratiu] We have formed a kind of democratic alliance, a convention made up of five parties for the purpose of working together. We will probably present joint candidates at the communal elections, something that will mark a first step toward crystalizing a credible opposition. However, what we need is to be able to have access to the country by means of communication in order to bring the Romanian people to their senses. To this day we have not managed to clarify this issue, which is a problem to us. The Romanian electorate is still scared, it still has a great fear of the unknown. If you recall, in last year's electoral campaign it was said that I came to sell the country; others said I came to buy it up, while yet others said I came to bring unemployment.... Well, today no one is saying that anymore! Now people realize that everything I said was a sound, correct analysis. The question is, can we, from being a string of parties, become a coalition capable of offering a government alternative? A genuine opposition exists only when it has a government in the making. If tomorrow we come to power, we must have an alternative government!

[Valenas] But you haven't told me how you will preempt electoral fraud, especially in view of the fact that the National Salvation Front [FSN] has increasingly less support?

[Ratiu] That is why the communal elections are particularly important, so that we can win various positions in a number of localities. In other words, some of the mayors and prefects must belong to the opposition, not the authorities. If they remain unchanged, then they will control the polls in next year's legislative election, too, and will commit the same fraud as last year.

[Valenas] I have heard many voices, both here and in the West, criticizing the decision of the two opposition candidates to run for the presidency of the Republic on 20 May. That allegedly guaranteed a republic system forcibly imposed by the Soviets. What is your opinion, especially since you were one of the three candidates?

[Ratiu] My position, which was the position of our party, is very clear: We want the Romanian people to decide freely on the form of government by referendum. We must explain the situation and present the true history of the Romanian nation, so that the entire country will know what Romania was and how it was under the constitutional monarchy, and will be able to make the comparison with the current situation. That is why I reject all the constitutional theses which rule that Romania is a republic. I have stated that the form of the Romanian state must be established by plebiscite.

[Valenas] Naturally, the ballot is secret, but if you, Mr. Ratiu, were voting in this referendum, would you vote for the monarchy or the republic?

[Ratiu] I don't know whether I will be a candidate in the coming election. What I can categorically state is my position at the previous election: If I had been elected president, I would have told the Romanian people the true history. A few months later I would have held a plebiscite in Romania to see whether we wanted to return to a constitutional monarchy or not. Anyway, I know King Michael well, I respect him, he is a very good Romanian, and I would be very happy if the Romanian people wanted to restore the constitutional monarchy in Romania!

[Valenas] One of our most acute problems is an independent television. Your old proposal for an independent television elicited a lot of talk. Have you abandoned the project? On the other hand, I was astonished to hear that a right-wing man like I.C. Dragan has a television station in Iasi. How do you view these matters?

[Ratiu] I will never abandon the struggle I started even before I came to Romania for an independent television station in Romania. The people cannot be appropriately informed unless we can have access to each citizen's home by means of an honest television. To me this is of a primary importance! If others secured television licences, be they even local, that's their business! I want a national television station to be built and I will continue this struggle until the project is accomplished.

[Valenas] At what stage is this project?

[Ratiu] Currently we are still hampered by the fact that the Audiovisual Bill has not yet been discussed and passed in Parliament. One thing has to be mentioned: In the past few months we have had the Audiovisual Bill on the Parliament working agenda every week, albeit toward the bottom of the package of laws.... If next week we don't get to it, it once again goes to the bottom of the agenda. And so forth...so it's being postponed from one week to the next. We recently had a talk with the Parliament leadership bodies and we said that this procedure is a farce. The Audiovisual Bill must be discussed and adopted, and as soon as we will have such a law we will know what conditions we have to meet in order to open an independent television station. I don't care whether this television station will be created by me or someone else, as long as it is truly independent! Then I'll be satisfied and I will support it!

[Valenas] And a last question: Will you run again for the presidency of the Republic?

[Ratiu] I am well prepared to answer this question, which I am often asked: I remind people of General Sherman, a great American hero, whom everyone wanted to be a presidential candidate. His answer was: "If you designate me, I will not accept, but, if despite the fact that I refused to candidate you still elect me, I will not serve as president!" Well, I won't go as far as that!

We shall see. Does anyone want me to run? I will decide when I'm invited to do so by a party, naturally by my party in the first place, as was the case at the last election. I will decide when the question arises. It will depend entirely on my health, my energy, and my desire to fight! I came back to Romania to contribute to achieving democracy! I believe with all my heart and all my conviction that I can be of real service if I am given the opportunity!

[Valenas] Thank you.

**Former Monarch 'Anti-Romanian,'
'Pro-Hungarian'**

*92BA0096B Bucharest TOTUSI IUBIREA
in Romanian 10-17 Oct 91 p 10*

[Article by Horia Brestoiu: "Michael of Hohenzollern Betting on the Hungarians"]

[Text] Of course, for a long time now it has not been news to anyone that during his short-lived time, Romania's former monarch displayed an undeniable lack of talent for ruling Romania's destiny. Without negating the difficult circumstances in which he ascended to the throne, he nevertheless turned out too little gifted and even less well inspired for adopting a correct attitude of equal distance from the scheming of conjunctural circles and interests which in the end spattered the crown with the blood of one of the most noteworthy Romanians and perfect patriots that our nation ever had as its leader, Marshal Ion Antonescu. Even decades later, Michael von Hohenzollern is incapable of grasping and admitting that he was irrevocably rejected by the Romanian people for exceptionally serious responsibilities on which history will not fail to dwell. Cavalierly ignoring the postwar dramas in which he had a hand, he is now waking up from a long hibernation to resume his chain of monumental blunders with cynical unawareness. Consequently, we will not be surprised to see that he is as easy to manipulate as in the past, secretly allying himself even with forces irrevocably opposed to the real interests of the country in order to return to the throne. It is therefore natural that we should wonder what kind of constitutional monarchy in consensus with the general interests of the Romanian nation could be promoted by a man sponsored by forces profoundly destructive to our national cause, such as Hungarian revisionists and fascist Iron Guardists?

Insufficiently aware of the ridiculous nature of this sterile strategy, he insists in grandiously posing as the "savior of the nation" while demanding reparations behind a naive and cheap propaganda according to which he allegedly represented a "unique solution" for resolving the country's complex problems and facilitating its entry into Europe. God protect us! These claims must not fail to be examined at another level, too. Having come into his old age after a dull life reduced to exclusively domestic concerns, the descendant in a crooked line of a dynasty that imposed national respect,

marked by the signs of a more than visible degeneracy, he is defying not only the implacable laws of biological facts, but especially the honor of the Romanian people on whose neck he imagines he can install an offspring utterly alien to the soul and genesis of a nation descended from Geto-Dacian and Roman blood!

And what national respect can be given to such a female descendant when Michael himself is not directly descended from the line of Carol I, who created Romania Mare [Greater Romania] together with noteworthy statesmen beginning with Ionel Bratianu? As is very well known, since Carol I did not have children, the crown was diverted to his nephew Ferdinand, then to Michael I, skipping over Carol II, then the father jumped back and overturned the natural succession.

One fact that today appears exceptionally grievous is that the former monarch did not hesitate to play the back-to-the-throne card even with Hungarian support from the shadows! Abandoning every rule of behavior marked by the most elementary reserve, he became decisively implicated in the scandalous affair of the Declaration of Budapest, an act that once again wounded the legitimate sensibilities of the Romanian nation and undeniably demonstrated to the contemporary world his fundamental lack of attachment to our great national commandments.

In order to secure unconditional goodwill for the Hungarian cause, the former monarch was skillfully and for a long time courted by the experienced professionals of an "influence network"—to use a strictly technical term of the secret front—and ended by placing himself kit and caboodle in Budapest's officious gratitude. The script calling for the "intoxication" of the naive personage was staged many years ago, when a very special role was played by Geza Szocs himself, who was deliberately planted into a long Swiss exile subsidized by Budapest for the express purpose of recruiting the ex-royal personage. We must admit that in this case the Hungarian special services showed great perspicacity and meticulous planning in cultivating that fully corruptible avenue. Once in the game, the former monarch, financially strapped as a result of material burdens, remorselessly placed his bet on Budapest's hand. The "pact with the devil" worked unimpeded through the arms of black propaganda, and in order to ensure adulation for the throneless hero, exactly six months before the Timisoara explosion, film director L.B. Goessel was preparing to make a movie about the former Romanian monarch, as we learned in *MAGYAR NEMZET* of 29 July 1989, a propaganda venture for which military historian Peter Gosztony and of course the ubiquitous Geza Szocs were coopted.

The other elements of the preset role provided his anti-Romanian position on the pattern of the Declaration of Budapest. For the rest, even after the officiation of the august initiation, he insisted on releasing to the European press a presumptuous communique from which the Romanian public was stunned to learn that the

pretender to the throne had committed an act, with seriously destructive consequences for the nation, on the strength of "his convictions regarding the relations between the Romanian and Hungarian peoples." Aside from the innocent confusion between a nation living in its homeland and a minority coexisting in the same land, those concerned glimpsed one of the pieces de resistance of the presumptive future program of a concessive monarchy, a program doctrinarily packaged in the stock terminology of "complementary space." Naturally, it was neither the first, nor will it be the last interview in favor of the House of Budapest. We should also remember the interview given for the Hungarian television in the same ideatic key of great modernistic inspiration on 31 July 1989, which supplied him with a fresh opportunity to discredit himself before the Romanian people. By signing these blank checks in favor of the interests of Hungarian revisionism, Michael of Hohenzollern inexorably proved his incapability to correctly digest the history and sacred rights of our nation. Devoid of the most elementary political sense in the face of events challenging the integrity of the national states legitimately formed on the basis of national self-determination after World War I, he denied acts to which his own ancestors had contributed and which in fact he claims.

Caught in a merry-go-round of imprudent declarations and busy securing a safe and well-furnished future for his offspring, the former monarch seems readier than ever to play to the hilt the role he assumed, a role that has become progressively worse as the secessionist events imposed by Hungarian revanchism in Central and East Europe became more compressed. His former efforts to return by covert means to Romania under the least credible pretexts in relation to the dubious scenarios used are already only too well known. The latest scenario, however, has highlighted a chain of facts and events which prove Budapest's direct involvement in the restoration endeavors.

The technique and succession of the curious events hail from the routine methodology of the Hungarian special services, so there is no reason for us to be surprised. Thus, only a few days ago, a so-called "Transylvanian government in exile" was formed in Budapest. At that same time the ex-king was leaving his residence in Switzerland to go to Paris to prepare the ground by launching an anti-Romanian, pro-Hungarian appeal. With Budapest's support, he announced his tempestuous return to Romania, this time in a Transylvanian area, in the purest style of Carol's deplorable restoration.

While those maneuvers were to be legitimized with the help of the ephemeral Transylvanian "government in exile"—a veritable bridgehead and springboard for the desperate ghost—in Bucharest sweet Doina Cornea and Simina Mezincescu, richly exploiting the great confusion created by the miners, rushed to the television to openly instigate the ouster of the current government system, and waxed poetic on the theme of the rescue mission of Michael of Hohenzollern at this time of great hardship.

In its turn, the PNT-cd [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party] Congress, which by an odd coincidence was just then being held in Bucharest, cavalierly proclaimed a call to bring Michael of Hohenzollern back on the throne.

One obviously doesn't need too great a stretch of the imagination to spot a certain connection among the events of this tumultuous unfolding of dark scenarios. But what is especially interesting is that they are all occurring against the background of and in the context in which Hungary is making the greatest possible efforts to impose the formula of Transylvanian autonomy, be it even under the circumstantial scepter of ex-king Michael. For the time being the plans have failed, but even postfactum they demand resolute evaluations and conclusions for the future. All the more so since as Yugoslavia's unraveling is viewed in Budapest as an almost done deed, Romania is viewed as the next potential victim. The "trial balloon" of these latest Budapest provocations has most forcefully brought us back to the obstacle course of the parties directed by the special services of this capricious and proud neighbor. Simultaneously with preparations for massive actions, we are being explored with "billiard coups" orchestrated through skillfully recruited sources ready to go out on barely disguised adventures. Among them the former monarch undoubtedly holds the orchestra box. Beyond the petty interests prompting him to come out on the stage, is it possible he does not realize that his myopic tactics inevitably place him in a position contrary to his own objectives? Stripped of the most elementary historical guarantees before our people, does he imagine that, having overnight become Budapest's apologist, his stock is about to rise? In Paris he lectured on the theme of what he termed an "anti-Hungarian campaign conducted by irresponsible persons and vile publications in Romania," something that prompts us to wonder, speaking of (ir)responsibility: Why does the former monarch refuse to acknowledge elementary realities and why does he invent ad hoc ingredients to the taste of his protectors? Undoubtedly the new distributor of gratuitous guilt should seriously and severely amend his public speeches so as not to stir up even more the anger of an honest people on whom the Hungarians are dumping a wave of slander as untrue as it is provoking. Otherwise we might conclude that the august personage does not realize the imminent risk of his transformation into a jolly fan of parodies and riddles, a passion that has been noticed before among personages of an advanced age.

Dragan Discusses Career, Future Political Plans

92BA0112A Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian
30-31 Oct 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Iosif Constantin Dragan by Eugen Eftimiu; place and date not given: "I Am Abjuring Satan"]

[Text] [Eftimiu] Whether you are praised or censured, Mr. Dragan, you are a personality, if only because you are among the richest Romanians abroad. Would you

therefore introduce yourself to our readers, who know you only from hearsay. Who are you Mr. Dragan?

[Dragan] I am a Romanian from Lugoj, who in 1940, after a scholarship in Italy, joined Europe's men of action without forgetting my roots for even one moment. I don't think that we can speak of wealth as of a great quality, since this is not the only way in which a Romanian can become significant abroad. Yes, I do have a name in oil circles, and especially in the world of liquid gas (Aragaz, as it is known in Romania), having created companies in Italy, Greece, Austria, Germany, France, Morocco, and even South Africa. Together with my studies in Italy (I graduated from the Bucharest University, then from the one in Rome, with a diploma in jurisprudence; I then studied at the School of Political and Economic Sciences, also in Rome) I started a small-scale commercial activity that expanded after the war into import-export operations involving a wide range of goods, from tires and produce to wheat and bricks. But foremost among them, are my efforts at Europeanism, with cultural endeavors having two special orientations: politics and weapons. Beginning in 1949, I brought together a number of Romanian leaders abroad into the "Romanian Movement for European Unity," which subsequently became the "Romanian European Movement," which included Mircea Eliade for instance; we sought to highlight Romania's presence, when Churchill offered Romania to Stalin on a silver platter along with other Eastern countries and lands. By editing several publications, from BULETINUL EUROPEAN [THE EUROPEAN BULLETIN] to EUROPA SI NEAMUL ROMANESC [EUROPE AND THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE], we became immersed in questions associated with the nation's history and culture. Through the association, and eventually the foundation that carries my name, we adopted a position, through an appeal, about the destruction of the country's churches.

[Eftimiu] Returning to the question of wealth, who do you believe is richer: Mr. Ratiu, Mr. Tiriuc, or you? Mr. Ratiu in fact, stated that directly or indirectly, he brought 4 billion into the country. Did you help Romania after the revolution?

[Dragan] The establishment of the Foundation has meant a material contribution of \$2 million. And since the country absolutely needs to enter into the business world, and since I am a valued marketing specialist, I have formed DEBS (Dragan European Business School) at Calea Rahovei No. 153, which on Friday, 25 October of this year started its new academic year. Added to this are many publications, among which an English language edition of "Istoria Literaturii Romane" ["History of Romanian Literature"] by Calinescu, which is sold at one-half its real price to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so that it can be offered to interested luminaries in Romania. And my contribution does not stop there.

[Eftimiu] With this in mind, could you tell us what connection exists between you and the newspaper RENASTEREA BANATEANA, to which you are said to have

donated ultramodern printing facilities? And how about the magazines ROMANIA MARE and EUROPA?

[Dragan] Yes, I am associated with RENASTEREA BANATEANA, which is a well-written and well-regarded paper. For the rest, I have no connection with ROMANIA MARE and even less with EUROPA, which I have never read.

[Eftimiu] An Italian publication has accused you of Legionarism, for which you have sued them but have not won.

[Dragan] That is not so. In fact, the whole thing started with the Milan magazine PANORAMA, which published an article accusing several personalities and also mentioning that I was an "admirer of Ceausescu" and a supporter of a so-called fifth column. These are in fact the vicious statements of such people as Paul Goma, whose true name is Paul Efreomovici, and whose Romanian origins are of unknown percentage. Yes, I did lodge a complaint against the magazine with the Italian prosecutor, which in the first trial brought an acquittal. But on the next day, the prosecutor lodged an appeal citing the facility of the verdict, and the case remains to be judged by the Court of Appeals in November-December. The arguments involved clippings from newspapers published after the PANORAMA article. Two compassionate judges were concerned with the serious penalties that PANORAMA could incur—six years of prison plus a fine of 6 million lire.

[Eftimiu] How do you feel about the recent miners' performance? Is it or is it not the expression of a neocommunist action?

[Dragan] I dislike the term miners' performance. What would you call the student or Gypsy protests? Student performance? Gypsy performance? But beyond terminology, I feel that the perception of democracy is distorted. The expressed vote is not respected. Demonstrations based on economic dissatisfaction are not devoid of influence of another nature, of divergent interests. In June, the miners came to supplement the thin forces of law and order. And alas, how badly the country's interests were harmed by the events of 13-15 June! In September, the situation was different: The interests were of all kinds—based on an acute lack of civic education—and the events took an undemocratic turn. Why, for instance, can such things not happen in Switzerland? Because the spirit of democracy is perceived otherwise.

[Eftimiu] The Romanian electorate was accused of not knowing how to orient itself on 20 May. What kind of men do you believe are capable of meeting the country's real needs, and primarily the need to extract the country from its present impasse?

[Dragan] During 1954-55, I published a magazine which pointed out the preponderance of economics (about 80 percent) in a country's total problems. A political man would therefore have to have a sound economic and

judicial training. Scholars and even engineers have proven not to be good leaders. One is born with the art of management, but more than that, one learns it; it therefore requires practice. Although he was an actor, Reagan became a good president after gaining experience as governor of California. A good leader must also have a sense for finance, must know how to work with figures. And of course, he must have an ethical and moral standing which will give him credibility. If a businessman, for instance, does not assure credibility based on honest dealings, he will go bankrupt. With respect to the orientation of the electorate, what can I say? Uscatescu—the philosopher—for instance, asked how is it possible for adventurers to want the Presidency; but adventurers are easy to understand.

[Eftimiu] Do you intend to participate in Romania's political life in the future, including its economic life? And if so, how?

[Dragan] I abjure politics as if they were Satan. Far be it from me to think of involving myself in politics. In the economy, yes. I am thinking—and some steps have already been taken—of the possibility of building houses in the Ukraine in exchange for natural gas for Romania. Then about roads, with the construction of highways, for which I have already financed a construction group in Constanta. After which there is the question of marketing, where I have already invested 14 million lei in the Calea Rahovei school.

Editor's note: We regret that the available space does not allow us to include more details, including those through which Mr. Dragan absolves himself of accusations regarding his relations with the communist regime (because his link with the country that he missed and in which his mother was still living could be achieved only with the approval of those in power), and those concerning the distribution of his business throughout the world, and lastly those associated with the nationalism-chauvinism relationship.

Chief Defends RTV, Rates Parties, Figures, Press

92BA0100A Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*
in Romanian 18, 19-20 Oct 91

[Interview with Mr. Razvan Theodorescu, president of Romanian Television, by Dan Stanca and Virgil Mihailovici: "People Want 'The Isaurian Slave'"]

[18 Oct pp 1-2]

[Text] [*TINERETUL LIBER*] Mr. President, you have been asked to resign just as often as the president of Romania. Do you know why, and if so do you have any feeling of guilt?

[Theodorescu] I can't say that it is anything abnormal. On the contrary. You must realize that all public TV companies—I don't use the term "state" companies because we are not a state TV company, because we have no state subsidy and we are the only TV company in

Eastern Europe, and one of the few on the continent, that does not have a state subsidy—are reproached in the same way, even in the very democratic countries. It is an unwritten law—when they are serious. Moreover the heads of the public TV companies are extremely beleaguered persons. I cannot have any feeling of guilt even for a moment because (and you can very easily check it) all the political parties and all the centers of power, including the Presidency, under which my position falls, all reproach me with something, not in regard to programming, because no one interferes with those matters, but in regard to alternating the news, proportioning, and so on. This means on the one hand that the institution is really on its feet, and on the other that we are not dependent on anyone. If everyone is dissatisfied, either it is a very bad TV company, which is not the case, or it is a TV company on which millions of Romanians are “dependent,” and I think that is our situation. I am sorry they are not doing things as we would like them. I can’t say that anyone in the press has maligned us, but note that to me the idea of the press is an important one for which I have all respect. But the press doesn’t mean everything that is printed in Romania.

I divide the “press” into the press properly speaking, including a few newspapers, and the printed paper that is good for wrapping! To me, the press today means ADEVARUL, LIBERTATEA, TINERETUL LIBER, TIMPUL, TITERATORUL and some cultural weeklies.

[TINERETUL LIBER] I see you exclude ROMANIA LIBERA....

[Theodorescu] Gentlemen, ROMANIA LIBERA and ROMANIA MARE are newspapers that insult the name of Romania!

[TINERETUL LIBER] Then you support President Iliescu’s idea...?

[Theodorescu] I don’t support anyone’s idea, but those are not the “press.” They are paper bearing printed symbols, and so I entirely reject what he writes in ROMANIA MARE, what he writes in ROMANIA LIBERA, and what he writes in many party newspapers, which are bad (But they are bad because so is the party’s life in Romania!).

[TINERETUL LIBER] Your opinions will get you more censure from the respective publications.

[Theodorescu] But I tell you again, they are not newspapers! They are printed paper! I cannot be attacked or maligned by something that morally and professionally does not exist.

[TINERETUL LIBER] In a recent issue of COTIDIANUL we read an interesting interview by Vartan Arachelian with Mihaelei Mihai in Paris. Is he still employed by the TV company or if not, why not?

[Theodorescu] Arachelian is a man with whom I get along relatively well, but don’t forget Arachelian was the most discredited journalist in TV(!).

[TINERETUL LIBER] We thought that Ilie Ciurascu...?

[Theodorescu] Arachelian was the most discredited one nevertheless, and only because of the bad luck whereby a broadcast of his made for 22 December 1989 had to be considered so important to the PCR [Romanian Communist Party] and the Propaganda Section that it was moved up to 21 December, at a time when many of us were on the streets and the first youths were beginning to fall. To be sure, others were compromised too, but it was his bad luck to have stuck his neck out more than the others, although frankly he aroused your curiosity by his vaunted “innocence...” until I met him, when he became a “case” for me and I was very anxious to see how a man could exude so much morality. And I let him, I let him and even pushed him ahead to a televised meeting of Darie Novaceanu with Petre Roman, because I knew from him that he had some “terrific” things to say, and I gave him an opportunity to say them directly. It was a fiasco. Arachelian violated the first collective and individual contract, which stipulates that you are not allowed to attack the institution that pays you. Arachelian did not understand that (oriental blood!) and I had to cite an example that he has since understood. If you do not want RTVR [Romanian Radio and TV] you can go to an alternative TV company. As you know there is SOTI, which even has the right to broadcast in Romania, and there is MEDIA PRO, and so it should not be dramatized in any way.

[TINERETUL LIBER] What are your relations with the TV trade unions?

[Theodorescu] They are not excellent with the Free Trade Union. I suggest to them that they not play so much politics. The Free Trade Union refuses to declare the number of its members. I don’t mean that the Free Trade Union was involved in the PNT-cd [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party] congress, where somebody shouted, “Let us help the Free Trade Union in TV to take over TV.” Paranthetically speaking, my father was in the Peasant Party, my uncle was a Liberal, and one of my grandfather was a Socialist. I have no partisan policies.

Editor’s Note: We thank Mr. Razvan Theodorescu for his good opinion of our newspaper, but we take the liberty of disagreeing with him about the unquestionable journalistic quality of ROMANIA LIBERA.

[19-20 Oct pp 1, 5]

[Text] [TINERETUL LIBER] Do you distinguish among parties as you do between the press and the nonpress?

[Theodorescu] That would be more difficult for me. However, in my opinion there are several parties, namely the Front, the PNL [National Liberal Party], the PNT-cd, the MER [Ecology Movement of Romania], the UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania], the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], and the PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania], and I don’t think I have forgotten any one of

them. To me, the other parties are a "joke" and I have nothing to say about them. The Civic Alliance Party, for example, is another "joke," representing an interesting transition from street folklore to a dictatorship, which used to attract the most faint-hearted....

[TINERETUL LIBER] What do you think of the Patriot organization?

[Theodorescu] It lies somewhere between irresponsible and criminal action.

[TINERETUL LIBER] How can you speak of the independence of a TV company that took over the inventory of a former state institution and now has an appointed president? Just what does it consist of?

[Theodorescu] I am the one who requested the deletion of the term "free," considering it a ridiculous epithet. We are free to the extent that Romania is free. Or it is not free of all its fantasies. Don't forget that our street politics depend upon a number of personages who have come up from obscurity. A great many failures, mental invalids and rejects passed through this office whom I later found in various parties, although they had a precarious moral and intellectual existence! If I stop and think that a man like Ticu Dumitrescu, an aimless agitator and a ridiculous figure, manages to become the object of a minimal public interest, it means that we are in a normal and free situation.

[TINERETUL LIBER] For whom are you going to vote in the next elections?

[Theodorescu] I don't vote, and I will tell you that my sympathies are with the members of a great many parties. I am on excellent terms with a few members of the Front and also with Mr. Rene Radu Policrat. I sympathize with Ioan Alexandru and with some environmentalists, and I have a weakness for Ion Ratiu.

[TINERETUL LIBER] But will you please specify just what a TV company's independence consists of?

[Theodorescu] It is independent if the most varied stands concerning the government are presented in the establishment. For my part, I can side with Rodica Becleanu's plainly "progovernment" broadcasts and the antigovernment ones of Janei Gheorghiu. I set out from the idea that people aren't robots and we all have our sympathies and antipathies. My first word as a nonjournalist, for I am not a journalist and if I were I would not have been there, was as follows: "I do not ask you to be robots without feelings, but I do ask you to conceal those feelings as part of your art." I was wrong. Those things cannot be concealed. And then the formula that you could see for the last 20 months is the one mentioned above. At one time "progovernment" broadcasts are transmitted, and then Razvan Theodorescu is a slave to the government, while at other times the broadcasts are against the government, but then it is forgotten that only Razvan Theodorescu is running the TV company! That,

if you will, is independence, and uncensored independence. What scandalized some in a discussion in the Social Dialogue Group last year, when I was asked, "How dare you use those words?" was the "vile" words: "Mr. Iliescu, in his delicacy, does not interfere." I can repeat that in his delicacy he does not phone me today either to ask me why I did such or such a thing. Mr. Ion Iliescu, and don't forget that I was appointed by him, calls up to make inquiries when he has any problem, and I admire him for that. There are other Western presidents who proceed otherwise. The case of Antenne 2 is well known now. Its management was changed after a telephone call from the president. With us, rather than with other smaller outfits, they call and come up with their complaints! Sometimes I have not even heard of them, or they are deputies who are the least gifted by God. I will not give examples here because it would be improper.

[TINERETUL LIBER] Then you do not have good relations with Parliament?

[Theodorescu] I am sorry that is so because Parliament largely believes that TV is a kind of cinema on which it always wants to appear. What is more, many members of Parliament want to be shown individually. If I were a member of Parliament I wouldn't be so anxious to appear on the small screen, especially before elections!

[TINERETUL LIBER] Here is a nonpolitical question: Why does TVR [Romanian Television] schedule such bad films, especially the films taken from Super Channel...?

[Theodorescu] You are right. It is a situation that we are going to remedy soon. Many really artistic films belong to the East European cinema. We went through a period when the audience wanted films from the West regardless of their quality. Do you know what happened to me when I showed "The Decalogue"? I received dozens of phone calls asking me to stop the serial. That is the situation! People want "The Isaurian Slave"! Well, is it bad? It is!

[TINERETUL LIBER] Thank you, Mr. Professor. It sounds better than Mr. President.

[Theodorescu] Yes, much better, and I thank you.

Bishop Rejects Political Role, Favors Reform

92BA0097C Bucharest *RENASTEREA BANATEANA*
in Romanian 2 Oct 91 pp 1, 15

[Interview with His Most High Holiness Daniel, Bishop of Moldova, by George Boieru; place and date not given: "The Church Is Not Part of the Governing Equation"]

[Text] [Boieru] We would like to know your views regarding the recent proposals from a political organization that you be named prime minister.

[Daniel] In our personal and ecclesiastical view, this is impossible because the church has declared its political

neutrality with respect to parties. The prime minister can thus not be a clergyman because he will inevitably have a partisan political position. In the second place, given that I am also a member of the Holy Synod, the Holy Canons would lose their political neutrality. In the third place, as has already been pointed out, the Holy Canons of the Orthodox Church forbid those who have been ordained to the priesthood to assume political and civilian functions. These canons have existed for centuries and we must respect them. The exception of Miron Cristea cannot become a rule, especially since he was regent and prime minister at a period when the church was part of the state. In the fourth place, for me personally it would be a matter of vainglory to accept such a function, because I believe that in spite of existing limitations and the country's problems, there are nevertheless many capable people—jurists, economists, laymen, civilians—who could assume such a function, who have the competence necessary to become prime ministers; as a result, I believe that the church would be more honored if it respected the gifts, the competence of civilians, who are in that sense capable of accomplishing this function. The church must be present in society, but in terms of its specific vocation, for spiritual, moral, and reconciliation matters. For these reasons I must refuse the function; I do not believe that this country needs to call on clergymen because it presumably does not have anyone capable of assuming such a function. It is commendable of those who advanced the proposal to have thought of us, but it is equally gracious for us to know where to stop.

[Boieru] Were you approached for this?

[Daniel] Yes, I was contacted by the National Liberal Party.

[Boieru] If you were consulted to recommend someone, would you have anyone in mind?

[Daniel] No, I could not say, because I am not competent to evaluate others from the standpoint of the country's needs. I think that among Romanian academicians who are economists, jurists, and men of some experience, there are some well-known persons who could fulfill the function of prime minister, but I have not had the time to ponder it, since I just returned yesterday from Geneva where I spent two weeks at the World Church Council. I could not therefore give you a specific name, but I am nevertheless convinced that there are men who could do it.

[Boieru] How did the meeting receive the news of the sad, violent events in Romania?

[Daniel] It is true that our image has deteriorated due to the violence, but on the other hand, the papers I read pointed out that these events are the consequences left by the past regime. All the countries in our situation are faced with the problems of transitional periods. Democracy is learned over a longer term and requires appropriate education; it requires that the population be informed; the government was viewed in a negative light

insofar as it did not prepare the population in time and did not sufficiently explain the need for reforms. Not a positive image, to be sure, when matters end up in violence. The forceful, violent entry into state institutions, the fires, the broken windows, show that we have a long way to go until we can express our will otherwise than in the past few days.

[Boieru] What is your opinion of these events?

[Daniel] My opinion is that on one hand, the people must be informed about the need for reform, and on the other, that the means must be found to make the reform bearable. In the words of the official statement, the church has urged the government to pursue a dialogue, to recognize the real problems, and has urged the miners to abstain from violence. My opinion is therefore that of the Patriarchate, that conditions must be viewed realistically while problems are solved in the most civilized manner possible, especially as they concern human lives being destroyed and suffering being caused by violence; things which the church can never accept, because the value of human life is infinite.

[Boieru] I thank you, and would like to ask when will we see you again on your native grounds?

[Daniel] I would be happy to see my native grounds again, but I am currently so busy that I could not give a date. I have great sympathy and much love for Timisoara, for all of Banat, for Lugoj, and I pray that God will bless the whole country and that section which gave the signal for change, but this change must also occur on the spiritual plane. In order to be profound, it must also include a revolution of the conscience, and for this it must involve not only the church, but all the institutions that follow the word and the spirit. It is a good thing that a new stage was started in Timisoara, but we, Romanians, have never been able to achieve a rebirth without going through sacrifices. I am glad you phoned me, I thank you, and I want you to transmit my blessings and cordial greetings to the friends and colleagues whom I met there.

Fundamental Flaws in Draft Constitution Alleged

92BA0096A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 22 Oct 91 pp 1, 2

[Article by Florin Gabriel Marculescu: "Toward an Undemocratic Constitution"]

[Text] In flagrant contradiction to the aspirations of the anticommunist revolution of December 1989, the draft constitution now being finalized is no different from the string of fundamental laws decreed by the communist power, the last of which—namely the one conceived and implemented by the current president's predecessor, Nicolae Ceausescu—will be abrogated only upon the new constitution coming into effect. What and how much is still in force from the Ceausescu Constitution is a question that the members of the Constitutional Commission haven't been able to answer clearly, nor do we

think that they ever intend doing so. However, we attempted to explain this aberration in place of those who by rights should be doing it. We suspect that the main objective is to perpetuate the republic as the form of government and particularly the institution of the presidency as the supreme power in the state.

Our honorable Constitutional Commission refuses to take into account the undeniable truths of history. It stubbornly insists on ignoring the huge and at the same time scandalous parliamentary farce by which on 30 December 1947 we were imposed a peoples republic. The 1923 Constitution (an impressively modern text) was temporarily taken out of circulation by a Parliament hastily "convened" in violation of its own rules of procedures, which was certainly not empowered to rule on constitutional matters. The executors of Stalinist orders in Bucharest ousted the parliamentary monarchy—our sole legitimate form of government—by means of abuse, violence, and shameless fraud. Of course, no one denies that almost 44 years have passed since then, during which time profound changes occurred in the awareness of a people controlled and led by terror and lies. However, the effects of the crisis of legitimacy into which we were thrown at the will of the omnipotent Soviet occupier have remained intact to this day. The postrevolutionary regime—communist in its nature and manifestations—continues to scorn the unchanging history of this land and to cling to its own illegitimacy, imagining that the truth can be concealed forever. The people are denied the elementary right to decide by referendum (as a compromise formula) on the form of government. The quasipresidential republic was established by (allegedly) constitutional acts issued by illegitimate bodies. The most conclusive example was the electoral bill itself on the basis of which the 20 May elections were held. Urged on by the FSN [National Salvation Front] oligarchy and by President Ion Iliescu's thirst for power, the Constitutional Commission hastened to shut its eyes and to embrace the thesis of a quasipresidential republic, but the way things are going, it can already be viewed as purely presidential. That, in fact, is the fundamental flaw of the new constitution, although not the only one.

They keep talking about the state of law, but its cardinal principle—the separation of powers in the state—was denied entry into the constitution because the holder of the constitutional law chair in Cluj, Mr. I. Deleanu viewed it as no more and no less than a "scientific error!" (Belonging, let it be added, to "insignificant" names compared to our illustrious constitutionalists, namely John Locke and Montesquieu.) His honor spoke on behalf of the "unity and uniqueness of the powers in the state," as in fact did Mr. Marian Enache, the leader of the FSN majority in the Chamber of Deputies and author of the embarrassing Podul Inalt declaration.... Mr. Deleanu's ideas don't even have the merit of being novel. They were heard in the French Constitutional Commission after the war, the one that drafted a constitution which was rejected by the popular referendum

held on 5 May 1946. At the time those ideas were supported by a notorious left-wing extremist, Pierre Cot. Along this line we will take the liberty of reminding Mr. Deleanu of the views of his Parisian colleague Jacques Cadart, the author of numerous treatises and works of constitutional law, shared by the overwhelming majority of contemporary constitutional jurists: "Today, like yesterday, the separation of powers is an evident requirement under democratic and free regimes. It is no longer a metaphysical principle, it is one of the maxims of the art of politics that must always be respected if we want the regimes to remain both liberal and effective. We must strongly emphasize that this separation must establish a balanced division of power among the fundamental institutions in the state." The sacred principle of the separation of powers—a sine qua non condition for an authentic democracy—penetrated our constitution through the authorized voice of Senator Mihai Ruva. He promoted it with his customary competence and recommended that it be sanctioned in the first article of the constitution. "In all my interventions in the Constitutional Commission I supported this fundamental principle of constitutional law. Like Madison (one of the founders of the Republican Party and president of the United States between 1809-17, ed. note), I claim that no other political truth has a greater intrinsic value than this principle. I fully agree with the French Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 1789, according to which a society does not have a constitution as long as it doesn't ensure guaranteed rights and the separation of powers," the distinguished senator recently said. His amendment was turned down. The amendment was phrased in terms almost identical to those of Article 114 of the Portuguese Constitution (adopted in 1976 against the background of striking political similarities): "The powers established in the state must respect the separation and mutual dependence sanctioned in the Romanian Constitution." The majority was seduced by the line of Deleanu-type Marxist arguments. By rejecting the Ruva amendment the Parliament members committed an error with the most serious consequences. Because the failure to recognize this principle will have negative repercussions on the other constitutional provisions, the balance between the three powers having been irremediably compromised. Let us illustrate the point. The judiciary power—demoted to the rank of a mere authority—is deprived of its essential attribute, that of verifying the constitutionality of the laws. The prerogatives of the executive power (the government) are expanded to the detriment of the legislative power (Parliament) by the establishment of legislative delegation, i.e., by the right given the government to issue primary legal acts in areas reserved par excellence for the law. In the past eight months or so this has become a most nefarious practice. And last but not least, let me recall the inadmissibly extensive prerogatives bestowed on the presidential institution, which is allowed almost anything, including for example, to declare a state of emergency or martial law without consulting the Parliament. And in order to not let go of even one sliver of power, the president has already installed himself (by an ordinary law) at the head of the

country's Supreme Defense Council, an omnipotent and omnipresent institution which we hope fully meets Professor Deleanu's leftist ideas. As for the draft constitution, it deliberately omits a definition of the nature and prerogatives of this (seemingly) harmless council which—by scandalously overstepping its duties—has come to rule even on the removal of the government. But there is no point in talking about legality these days. The Power's decisions substitute for the law!

And if to the above we added the absence of any constitutional guarantees regarding the exercise of human rights (which can be at any time curtailed by ordinary laws), we will get the picture of a constitution boasting a spuriously democratic air, while in reality it paves the road for abuses of power and even for a dictatorship. Time would allow substantial improvements in it, but the FSN majority is not a fan of democracy. As Milan Kundera would say, it is walking through the present blindfolded.

New Culture Minister Discusses Goals, Problems

92BA0097A Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian
22 Oct 91 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Minister of Culture Ludovic Spiess by Amalia Spalatel; place and date not given: "The George Enescu International Festival Brought Me Here"]

[Text] [Spalatel] Mr. Spiess, you are known as a famous opera singer. How do you feel about this new "role" of minister of culture?

[Spiess] Your questions are very direct and very subtle. You realize of course that because I have only recently been nominated I have not yet managed to assimilate all the problems that await me; I am a sponge thirsty to know absolutely everything because I am curious, and I believe that in order to be involved in this business I must know on whom and on what I can rely. I am happy, I am delighted that those on whom I rely are very receptive and kind.

[Spalatel] As far as I know, ministers of culture in other countries have already been designated from among actors and writers. Do you feel particularly moved by the thought that you are the first opera singer to become minister of culture, the leading voice of Romanian culture?

[Spiess] That is an interesting question. Had it been an actor, the musicians, painters, sculptors, writers and all those associated with culture would probably wonder what would happen to them. Now, all except the musicians are wondering about it. I want to assure them all that my outlook and my thoughts are oriented equally toward all the arts. To be sure, some of them will have priorities, but they will be aimed at those who want to experience and receive immediate results—the Romanian public.

[Spalatel] Do you think that your success as director of the George Enescu International Festival has led to your ministerial position?

[Spiess] I am convinced that the George Enescu International Festival "cast me" or brought me to it. If that's the case, I am really happy, because—with apologies for my lack of modesty—the Festival did give me great pleasure and great satisfaction. On a very short schedule, with a team of extraordinary people, and with the support of the Ministry of Culture, we succeeded in reviving this major presentation of Romanian culture. I continue to dwell on this because the repercussions both from Romania and especially from abroad are extraordinary (the event is gradually fading away in this country, but the reports that continue to arrive from abroad are among the best). And it is further proof that a country with traditions such as ours, a country that has given us Eminescu, Brancusi, Enescu, and many, many others, can draw attention and impose itself internationally through art and can obtain what it deserves, a reintegration into a greater Europe, into the greater world.

[Spalatel] Do you foresee some way out of the current impasse of Romanian culture, by which I mean the budgetary one?

[Spiess] The budget is of course a serious problem. It has been, it is, and will probably continue to be. We are all aware of the difficulties, problems of our country's economy. From the small amount allocated to culture, we will try to provide proper support for all the arts, and in addition all of us will seek new sources and facilities to complement it as necessary.

[Spalatel] Do you expect an expansion of your ministry based on your collaborators' competence?

[Spiess] I would welcome it, and I hope to find goodwill among all my colleagues, in all disciplines, and in all the arts; and a mutual understanding that art will impose itself, be confirmed, and assume the position it must occupy through its quality—I don't want quantity, I want quality—because that is what stands out, what draws attention, and what moves us forward.

[Spalatel] Can we expect a reorientation in Romania's cultural institutions, considering that during this short time (since you are a minister in a "short-term government") spectacular changes can take place in culture?

[Spiess] Of course, as everyone knows—and especially you, the press—the minister of culture has a wide area of action. We will devote particular attention to museums, the national heritage, theater, music, and books, we will carefully nurture the young generation, the youngest ones, because it is in them that we must develop a taste for beauty, art, culture, since they are the spectators, the public, our future happiness.

[Spalatel] Because you are a great personality and an international messenger of Romanian culture, we expect from you a broader expansion in our cultural relations

with the world. What do you foresee for Romania's more active presence in the world's circle of cultural values?

[Spiess] This is actually the third day that I have been interviewed in this important function as minister of culture. I can sincerely tell you that my life has been completely changed in these three days. I had a "breather" on Wednesday night when I left the Senate, came home very calm and relaxed, and said to myself: that is that. I was very happy that a solution could be found. In any case, I was determined, if asked, to help the one nominated to this chair with all I have, all I can, all I know. I see that I now have to help myself, because that "breather," that quiet night, did not last long, only until yesterday morning when my peace was once more shattered; now, I am ready to struggle, to explain, to contribute all I can to resettle the arts, culture, on the foundations they deserve, so that this will truly be a way for us to be received, accepted, believed, and viewed with new eyes throughout the world, because the tradition of arts and culture in our country compels us and lends us the courage, the hope to promote its cultural values along all the latitudes of the Earth.

During that quiet night, I received messages from Germany, Italy, and France. I responded to the congratulations by saying that it was only an intention, a thought, that it had not yet been settled, but the callers thought I was joking. I was very sincere and was telling the truth. In the meantime, they continued to say: "We will do what we discussed," "just as we established," "we are glad for you, whom we know, we are looking forward to meeting you again, no matter where, here or there."

This naturally makes me happy, and I intend to focus for the time being on these relationships and acquaintances both here and abroad. We will widely open our arms, hearts, and souls to all those who have left Romania, even if they are no longer Romanian citizens; they are ambassadors of our art, our country's pride, they are our product, polished and perfected with time. I believe that a new meeting between these great world stars and the public that encouraged them at the start, that gave them faith in the career they chose, would refresh them with the youth and confidence they need until the end of their careers. I would like these meetings with artists in all fields to be as frequent as possible, being convinced that their return to the international circuit will lead to good prospects and a good opinion of our country throughout the world. To repeat: Through art we want to contribute fully and substantially to the image that our generous nation must develop in the world awareness. This has been a sorely tried nation. We are searching, and I am convinced that matters will settle down, clear up, and that equilibrium will triumph, will bring the prosperity, light, and peace which we all need.

Transylvanian Government-in-Exile Chief Queried
92BA0097D Bucharest RENASTEREA BANATEANA
in Romanian 30 Sep 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Zaharia Gh. Dan, president of the "Transylvanian Emigration Government," and Szabo Kalman

by Eleonora V. Popa and Ildico Achimescu in Budapest; date not given: "You Have No Way of Knowing Who I Am, Whether It's Me or Not"]

[Text] [RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Mr. Zaharia, we consider it a courtesy that you have accepted to grant us an exclusive interview one hour before the press conference which we understand you have announced.

[Dan] First of all, I have two questions of my own. Are you from a Romanian paper, what paper?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] From RENASTEREA BANATEANA in Timisoara.

[Dan] Do you have a card, something, an identification?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] We have everything, employer identifications, and cards, and passports.

[Dan] You don't need passports, because the assault that took place is over. From what paper?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] This is our paper; it printed the two articles that appeared in the Hungarian press as well as the message from the editor; you thus know the orientation of the paper on which we work.

[Dan] Does RENASTEREA BANATEANA still exist? I know that its publication was suspended twice and that it stopped appearing.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] It was suspended only once, for one day, and was published even then, with blank pages.

[Dan] You should not be surprised by our distrust, but the assault took place here. But let's not digress; you cannot stay for the press conference that will be held in one hour?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] I don't believe so, because we must get to Timisoara with the information you will give us, and that is far from here.

[Dan] Too bad, because this is an international press conference.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Nevertheless, we are interested in a few things about which those around here will not ask you; maybe you will tell us about them now, considering that we came specially for this interview.

[Dan] Considering that you are from Timisoara and that the other members of the government are all from Timisoara... The problem is the following: My wife called me from Brasov and asked me to send a car to Arad to bring them here, because she and our child are in Romania.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] But it is here that you were beaten, at least according to the statements in the Hungarian press.

[Dan] This is where there has been a murder attempt, they wanted to kill me. And now there are attempts

against her in Romania. So now what? I must find a way to solve this. I want to give you a copy of the letter I wrote to the Romanian Consulate late last night, please read it.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Mr. Zaharia, here in Budapest the people have a curious reaction to the name of the party that has received you. Every time we said "Kisgazdapart" [Smallholders Party] we were treated to all sorts of curses, and not of the nicest sort.

[Dan] Do you know why? Because they know that this is where the attack took place, the area is full of commandos and everything else. You can't see them, but know that they are here. And for them it's a matter of honor, that is, you pretend to come into my garden to straighten things out?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] How long have you been here in Hungary?

[Dan] Since February of this year.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] And when did you get the idea of forming this so-called government in exile?

[Dan] Allow me to start the tape recorder, because that is what we usually do, and you can record as well when I tell you. Please repeat the two questions now (...). I hope that you are journalists in the proper sense of the word and that you are not tools of distortion. In any case, our recording remains. This idea, of a free and independent government did not occur to me, or to him, or to anyone else. The idea exists. Many have died for it, others will die after us, but the idea will endure. Those who know history, know that in 1500-1600 Transylvania was in a "status quo." And because we have been rich in land, and because we have always been buffeted by the winds in one form or another, we have been colonized in turn by whoever wanted to do it. All in all, and purely by fate, we have been the only bastion of Christianity stuck in the middle of Islam. We never were a Turkish pashalik. And of that I am proud.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Timisoara was.

[Dan] That is why one of our first ideas was that Timisoara be proclaimed the capital, so as not to overlook it once more, not to abandon it as it had been abandoned and forgotten when it became a Turkish pashalik. That was the idea. You will hear our program platform in response to questions from the journalists at the press conference.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Do you have such a program platform?

[Dan] Categorically yes!

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Did you already hold a press conference before this one? Because that is what we understood from the Hungarian press.

[Dan] We contacted a few journalists, or more correctly, they contacted us, at times by force, meaning that they brazenly invaded us, and we treated them as such. We gave them strange information to say the least. If you want, I can also give you a demonstration, in that we will talk for one hour and you will not be able to write anything. We can also do it like that.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Please remember that Timisoara is a well-informed city, and that we don't want to mislead our readers.

[Dan] I don't know why you say that. I am equally fond of those from Craiova and from Iasi.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] But not through the Hungarian radio and television stations.

[Dan] But you should be aware that Romanians, and Hungarians, and Jews, and Saxons also live there, and that is exactly what we wanted, to stop counting them, to stop saying "how many are you." No, we are all Transylvanians.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] We confess that in coming to these offices, we thought we would meet either some "raw" youths or men that were well past their retirement age. Especially when we learned that you were an officer.

[Szabo Kalman] If you are from Timisoara, I expect you know Calea Lipovei. That is where the cemeteries of the poor, of the Jews are, because that is where there was a very large Jewish population. And where is that population now? There is a smaller Jewish population now throughout Romania than there was before. And I ask you where is it? The Rabbi sold them out. He sold out the Germans also. An interesting bit of information, which has escaped the Rabbi of Hungary, is that Moses Rosen passed through Budapest. They had prearranged a meeting two or three weeks earlier; Rabbi Lazarovics set everything aside in view of this meeting, but Mr. Rosen took French leave. He effectively avoided meeting a religious colleague. However, what is important is not this but the fact that the Saxons and the Swabians were sold out, and that the Jews were sold out.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] But it would seem that it suited them.

[Dan] I don't think so, because an uprooting after 800 years doesn't suit anybody. Think about it: We are committing a crime in Europe, destroying a thousand-year old culture.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Just the same, I believe that they could no longer endure the situation in Romania, and having the opportunity to leave, they left. We couldn't bear it either, but we stayed because we were at home and had nowhere to go.

[Dan] It could not have suited them, because their culture was being destroyed day by day. Germans coming to Transylvania were returning into history,

finding national costumes, customs, which are no longer being preserved in Germany. They were purely and simply looking at their past. Transylvania, as the Romanian paper ROMANUL has said, is considered to also have Romanian citizens of Hungarian origin, meaning that they have been Hungarized, but for practical purposes they are considered Romanian. You hear that with each passing day the Hungarians must leave. We are destroying their culture, which can never be rebuilt.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] But what you want is to pry Transylvania away from Romania!

[Dan] We want a confederation. Transylvania was an independent state. We want the same thing that today's modern Europe wants: the elimination of custom stations, of borders, so that nations can live in peace and harmony. Transylvania must be maintained, and what Bucharest wants cannot be; Bucharest has a Byzantine culture which it has always practiced, and Transylvania has a Western culture. Bucharest has always acknowledged that Banat and Transylvania are the West. It is said that Banat is the leader, and lo and behold, so it is.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] We understand, Mr. Szabo, that you have the position of prime minister on this government's list. What is your profession?

[Szabo Kalman] I am a teacher.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] That's good. And you, Mr. Zaharia? If you want, I will phrase the question another way: Who are you, Mr. Zaharia?

[Dan] Something is still missing.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] And here it is. What have you been doing for the past five years?

[Dan] I have been waiting! During the past five years I have installed listening systems, electronic protection and security systems. I am a technician in the Romanian Army with the civilian rank of colonel. I belonged to CI [expansion not given], in the former Bureau 2, if you know the history of the Army.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] No, we don't know it. Please tell us.

[Dan] This is Army information. I will prove it to you. (He places in front of us an envelope full of documents.)

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Mr. Zaharia, if that is your real name—because you will understand that we could speculate, given that we have identified ourselves while you have not—are you not afraid?

[Dan] Yes, you have no way of knowing who I am, whether it's me or not. Here is my passport, and after you have looked at this one, I will give you another one.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Well, it does not look very much like you.

[Dan] Why? Because I have no moustache on the photo?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Not only the moustache, nothing much else looks like you.

[Dan] How about this one?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Yes, in this one, yes. In the second passport there is no difference from the person in front of us, but in the first one, we are left with a large question mark. But let us get back to the problems that brought us here. Are you convinced that the great majority of the Transylvania population wants this independence?

[Dan] We are not convinced of it, but given the inertia, the opportunity that exists in society...if you don't mind, please turn off the recording (...).

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Mr. Zaharia, a lot of money is being coined on the fact that Hungary has always had a "warm spot" in its heart for Transylvania. In this context, with all the rumors and suspicions, doesn't the fact that your offices are in Budapest serve to confirm these rumors that Hungary is giving you a hand?

[Dan] Whenever there was hunger during Ceausescu's regime, whenever the house was cold or there was no power, whenever the children had nothing to wear, someone shouted "help, the Hungarians are killing us." Am I right? That was the social drug. Isn't that so?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] I don't think so. Ceausescu did not hide behind these problems. In his time no one was whining and he did not wash his dirty laundry in public. He did not use the Hungarians for a shield, not in his days.

[Dan] Don't you remember Ceausescu's press conference at the beginning of the revolution, when he said textually that in Bucharest things are not like in Budapest, that in Romania "no one, no one, has nothing with no one," when he meant to say that "no one has anything against anyone." And this proved to be a verified method and policy. It was effective.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] And doesn't it seem to you that your very presence, here and now, confirms the truth of this policy?

[Dan] Of course, in keeping with this policy, anyone can now come and say that it's the Hungarians...again, and why wasn't this government formed in Tierra del Fuego?

[Szabo Kalman] You should know that we have not received any support from the Hungarian state; on the contrary, all the newspapers are attacking us, and the officials as well.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] And after you made yourselves known as a government in exile, don't you consider your existence on Hungarian soil as support?

[Dan] No. According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, refugees have the right to stay here. In Arad, I tried to put together a monument for the 13 generals, as a result of

which I came into conflict with the authorities on the grounds that it would offend national feelings. I don't know whether history can offend national feelings, since it is the truth. Had this monument been erected, the Statue of Liberty in the United States could have been ashamed of itself. It is a monument that all Europe and the world would come to see. And I know that very few of these generals were Hungarian. They were from the 1848 Revolution.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Let's get back. You just recently disclosed your presence here, your existence as a government. What is your next step? And in any case, there are rather few of you for a government in exile.

[Dan] That is your opinion. Those of us who are here have been the target; we said that someone has to break the ice.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Do we understand that you are backed by someone?

[Dan] We are backed by its highness, the Transylvanian people.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] But do you have a large organization?

[Dan] We are organized in Transylvanian cells. The Legionnaires also had cells, I know.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] No, you don't know: The Legionnaires had dens, the Communists had party cells.

[Dan] Our cells, if they were known, if they were known to the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], could be easily dissolved. One politician here spoke to the press and asked: "These adventurers, who the devil is backing them?" Are they backed by anyone, do they have any support? Does such an idea of self-determination, a natural gesture of a state born in 800 years, need a sponsor?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] But isn't it natural for the state on whose soil you were born to have its say, to say whether it recognizes your existence or not?

[Dan] I personally don't think so; I think you can operate without receiving these approvals. The problem is the following: it's that, in exactly one-half hour...well, I'll tell you so you don't learn it from the press conference. Given what has happened in Romania, and you have a copy of the letter that I have sent to the Romanian Consul in Budapest, I told myself that this press, and possibly the foreign one that might come, are a struggle. It is like when something is under a magnifier, and magnifiers are not always well polished, they distort, and thus give rise to the information monsters, rumors. Then what do we do?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Mr. Zaharia, let's refocus our ideas, and until you decide whether to tell us about your bombshell or not, let's continue if you will

along the line that we suggested. How do you think you are currently seen by the Romanians who want a unified country, a Greater Romania? Have you ever thought about their opinions?

[Dan] I wonder whether the Romanian Romanians, who want a Greater Romania from the Nistru to the Tisa, ever think about the opinions of the Hungarians who will be included in the Greater Romania?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] What should they say, what could bother them? They are after all, a minority on Romanian land.

[Dan] That is the great mistake. The great mistake rests in this word, minority, which of course exists in the dictionary. I'm not saying it should be removed from the dictionary, or that new words should be introduced, but in our platform we are saying something entirely different. We do not mention the concept of minority.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] What did you replace it with?

[Szabo Kalman] With the term Transylvanian nation. We have simmered like in a pot for some 1000 years. If the Daco-Romanians could create a Romanian nation in 70 years, in 1000 years, three or four nationalities can create a Transylvanian nation.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] In other words it would be like: Transylvanian citizen of this or that nationality.

[Dan] Of course.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Mr. Zaharia, are you by any chance supported by the Romanian UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania] in this action of yours?

[Dan] Of course...not. They would be wasting their time, they no longer play a role, I don't see the reason for their existence. To say from their point of view, "It's a good thing they're doing over there," *qui prodest?* [Who benefits from this?] Do you have the "Omagiu" book?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Unfortunately not.

[Dan] You would have found in it Domokos Geza and Suto Andras hunting with Ceausescu.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] You may be surprised, but we still love Suto and consider him a great writer.

[Dan] I also like Paunescu, for instance, as poet and journalist.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Mr. Zaharia, we hate to interrupt you, but here comes the press and until they get here we would like to learn a few things. Did this government come to life with the first signal from the Hungarian press, or did it exist before?

[Dan] We formed it on 2 September of this year, but we did not disclose it to the press at that time.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] But is the date of 18 December, published in the Hungarian press as the date on which you wanted to form yourselves, a rumor?

[Dan] Yes, of course, in order to give the Romanian Securitate the time to work. We gave them a rumor that we have a platform, that we will hold a conference or convention, and in honor of Timisoara, which will also be the capital of Transylvania, we will form a government on 18 December. That is how this came to be.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] That is not exactly how the Hungarian press wrote it. I suspect that with all those from Timisoara around here, you also find support in Timisoara.

[Dan] I think I forgot the answer.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Let me try another way: Do you have contacts with any party, union, or organization in Timisoara?

[Dan] I forgot the answer to this one also, and just as well. But I'll tell you the bombshell: Yesterday, during a session that lasted from 1230 to 1930 in the evening, putting absolutely everything in the balance and foregoing personal pride, we decided, with the European support of the Budapest officials, to dissolve the government in exile.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Was the whole story a masquerade? A provocation?

[Dan] No, we will be a cultural association which fights for the rights of man. We expect everyone to understand that we are showing the way to something. No other government, no other country can be involved in all of this: If we have operated here, it was for situational, security reasons; but as long as the Hungarian and Romanian press wants to involve parties and governments, we do not want to place them in jeopardy. Europe is a powder keg right now, and one match can blow it all up. To elaborate, after the attempt on my life I was asked to request protection from the Hungarian authorities, but I didn't sign it because it would have involved the Hungarian Government. The only place where the authorities were involved was the complaint to the district police, which conducted an investigation. Now, I expect a maneuver: In order to put out this fire, it is possible that an attempt will be made to prevent the press conference through various channels and means; of

this I am convinced. To prevent us from holding it. No one will show up, or the writers will be ordered not to come.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Is it still possible over here to impose an action directive for journalists?

[Dan] I'm not saying it will be the state or someone, but the newspaper owner for personal reasons. We have tape recorded all discussions with the press, so that we know that nothing written by the Hungarian press corresponds to reality. We have built a data bank.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] I find it natural that you should work in an organized manner at the function level you have chosen. That I don't find it natural that you do what you do, that is only my business, but if you do it, you probably have some evidence of your contacts or of the discussions which you hold. Just as it seems natural that to the extent to which you will continue your activity, we will meet on the barricades the next time. I hope you don't have the slightest doubt that RENASTEREA BANATEANA will always find itself on the other side of the barricade.

[Dan] This is normal, we are Europeans after all, we can fight with ideas.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] Mr. Zaharia, do you have even an ounce of conviction that you will succeed in your action?

[Dan] In some peoples' view, we are indeed madmen who had the courage to state an idea that has endured and existed for centuries. Do you know the difference between courage and madness?

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] We have one more question: Knowing your antecedents, the places you have worked, involvements you have had, can't someone say that Mr. Zaharia Dan was infiltrated in here to find out what this committee is doing? And to eventually lead to its self-dissolution?

[Dan] I'd like to see the one who leaves his 15-year-old child and his wife at home, and comes here as a wolf in sheep's clothing, and has the courage to show himself in front of journalists and officials, and what's more, to instill ideas and opinions.

[RENASTEREA BANATEANA] We'll go a little deeper without the least intention of insulting you: We have read that you are a former convict, a common law felon. Is there any truth to these "rumors"?

[Dan] Common law? If being arrested because I twice wanted to shoot Ceausescu is known as common law felony, then I am a felon.

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